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HOW MUCH PUNISHMENT IS ENOUGH?: EMBRACING
UNCERTAINTY IN MODERN SENTENCING REFORM
Jalila Jefferson-Bullock
For nonviolent drug crimes, we need to lower long
mandatory minimum sentences––or get rid of them
entirely. Give judges some discretion . . . . We need to
ask prosecutors to use their discretion to seek the best
punishment, the one that’s going to be most effective,
instead of just the longest punishment.
President Barack Obama1
He describes every day as a waste of time. He rises daily at five
o’clock in the morning, jarred awake by the remembrance that he is
still there. In actuality, the journey to full wakefulness begins when
he lays his head down to sleep. Haunted by visions of what life
should be like—fully vested retirement, family vacations, loving
wife beside him, giggling children—he sleeps in disarray. It does
not matter much. Long gone are the times when a good night’s rest
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President Barack Obama, Speech at the NAACP’s 106th National
Convention in Philadelphia (July 14, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2015/07/14/remarks-president-naacp-conference.
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was necessary fuel for an activity-laden day. These days are an
unending abyss of torpidity.
After rising, dressing, and breakfasting, he sits around and
writes. He uses a tiny corner spot where no one bothers him. After
writing for several hours, he exercises by walking several miles on
an outside track, weather permitting. After that, he eats lunch. There
are no classes at the facility where he is housed, so he writes again
until dinnertime. After dinner, he goes to bed. This is the routine that
he follows Monday through Friday. His Saturday schedule is
identical, except that he spends one hour cleaning the family visiting
room before breakfast. He mops.
Sunday is his favorite day. On Sundays he attends three onehour religious services after breakfast. He sings with an unrehearsed
choir and plays the tambourine. By noon, services are over. He has
lunch, and then returns to writing. After dinner, he lays his head
down and commences another night of fitful slumber.
Every day is a waste of time. He will follow this routine every
day for the next decade. His ten-year period of incarceration will
cost American taxpayers approximately $290,000 in total.2 Worse,
in ten years of time, he will not have acquired any additional
educational or professional degrees, certifications, or skills. He will
not have learned any supplementary emotional intelligence
techniques, nor will a qualified, licensed expert have taught him
coping mechanisms. Quite simply, he will not be ten years better.3
Yet, he will be expected to reenter society and reintegrate fully. The
stakes are even higher if he fails and recidivates. Sadly, there are
scores more prisoners just like him.4 How much punishment is
enough?
2

See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL
PRISON POPULATION BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES AND
OPTIONS 9 (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf.
3
The goal of federal incarceration cannot be rehabilitation. See Tapia v.
United States, 564 U.S. 319, 334–35 (2011) (noting that a court may not take into
consideration a person’s rehabilitation “or otherwise . . . promote rehabilitation”
when making sentencing decisions).
4
This particular story is of a federal prisoner who is well-known to the
author. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.); JORDAN BAKER ET AL., A SOLUTION TO PRISON OVERCROWDING AND
RECIDIVISM: GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM LOCATION OF PAROLEES AND

HOW MUCH PUNISHMENT IS ENOUGH?

347

INTRODUCTION
It has now become fashionable to loudly proclaim that the U.S.
criminal justice system is irreparably broken and requires a
complete dismantling and total reconfiguration.5 The evidence is
robust and the record is clear.6 Prisons are bloated and bursting with
prisoners; budgets are ill endowed to support them; and offenders,
due to excessive periods of unfruitful incapacitation, reenter society
lacking in contributable and marketable skills.7 Racial disparities
continue to corrupt charging and sentencing decisions; police
brutality and human massacre are, woefully, commonplace; and the
cycle continues.8

PAROLEES AND PROBATIONERS 42 (2002) (addressing the “plummet[ing]” support
of rehabilitative programs due to recidivism).
5
See generally Peter Baker, 2016 Candidates are United in Call to Alter
Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1DERGad; Peter
Baker, Bill Clinton Concedes His Crime Law Jailed Too Many for Too Long, N.Y.
TIMES (July 15, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1HvZBL9; Erik Eckholm, A.C.L.U. in $50
Million Push to Reduce Jail Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://nyti.ms/1uDzbmQ; Bill Keller, Prison Revolt, NEW YORKER (June 29,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/prison-revolt; Editorial
Board, Justice Kennedy’s Plea to Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1EXdUcJ; Editorial Board, Ending the Rikers Nightmare, N.Y.
TIMES (June 24, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1SJ6cH2.
6
See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, How to Cut the Prison Population (See for
Yourself), N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1L3HwZ4; Ian Lovett, Los
Angeles Agrees to Overhaul Jails to Care for Mentally Ill and Curb Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1ORJART; Marc Mauer & David Cole, How
to Lockup Fewer People, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1dr0RoH.
7
Jesselyn McCurdy, New Report Shines a Light on Solitary Confinement,
AM.
CIV.
LIBERTIES
UNION
(June
5,
2013,
11:20
AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/new-report-shines-light-solitary-confinement; Erica
Goode, Solitary Confinement: Punished for Life, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1IkH1E3.
8
John Eligon & Mitch Smith, Emergency Declared in Ferguson After
Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1IDHpOa; Adam Liptak,
Exclusion of Blacks From Juries Raises Renewed Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16,
2015), http://nyti.ms/1LeZEzd; John Eligon, A Year After Ferguson, Housing
Segregation Defies Tools to Erase It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1KZj0Z5.
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The United States’ criminal sentencing laws too often fail to
advance any legitimate law enforcement objective.9 Criminologists,
judges, practitioners, political leaders on both sides of the aisle,
social scientists, other impartial observers, and even President
Obama point to wasted fiscal resources, overcrowded prisons and
9

See Jelani Jefferson Exum, Sentencing, Drugs, and Prisons: A Lesson from
Ohio, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 881, 882 (2011) [hereinafter Exum, Sentencing, Drugs,
and Prisons]; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 59 (2010) (stating that the war
on drugs targeted mostly low-level street dealers). See generally Kate Stith &
Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227 (1993);
Thomas Orsagh & Jong-Rong Chen, The Effect of Time Served on Recidivism: An
Interdisciplinary Theory, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1988) (“[W]hen
prisoners serve longer sentences they are more likely to become institutionalized,
lose pro-social contacts in the community, and become removed from legitimate
opportunities, all of which promote recidivism.”). These sentencing laws not only
detrimentally impact the individuals who serve the time in prison, they undermine
the communities and families who have loved ones behind bars. See generally
SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: TRENDS
1991-2007
(Feb.
2009),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_incarcerated
parents.pdf; CHARLENE W. SIMMONS, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU,
CHILDREN
OF
INCARCERATED
PARENTS
(Mar.
2000),
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/00/notes/v7n2.pdf; JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN
INST., FAMILIES LEFT BEHIND: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND
REENTRY (2005), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310882_families_left_behind.pdf.
Academics continue to document these problems and offer concrete solutions. See, e.g.,
JULIE SAMUELS ET AL., URBAN INST., STEMMING THE TIDE: STRATEGIES TO
REDUCE THE GROWTH AND CUT THE COST OF THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM 1
(2013),http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412932-stemming-the-tide.pdf. Even
those charged with enforcing the laws agree the system continues to be broken
and in need of reform. See, e.g., Eric Holder, U.S. Attn’y Gen., Remarks at the
Annual Meeting of the Am. Bar Ass’n’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annualmeeting-american-bar-associations; see also MICHAEL HOROWITZ, U.S. OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, TOP MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE
CHALLENGES
FACING
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE
(2013),
http://www.justice.gov/oig/challenges/2013.htm (listing the “growing crisis in the
federal prison system” as a top management and performance challenge);
Editorial Board, Prison Reform: Seize the Moment, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitorsview/2013/0812/Prison-reform-Seize-the-moment.
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court dockets, growing recidivism rates, and overly punitive
punishment as significant failures that sentencing reform must
correct immediately.10 After decades of imposing an ill-reasoned
sentencing regime on multiple generations of offenders, federal
sentencing reform is finally upon us.11 Federal lawmakers are poised
to reform criminal sentencing laws now.12
There are many roots of this criminal justice crisis and numerous
injurious fruits borne of it.13 Countless well-intended proposals have
emerged to cure federal punishment of its ills,14 yet one simple
remedy emerges as a leader in overhauling our outmoded, unjust
sentencing structure: abolishing lengthy, determinate federal

10

See Exum, Sentencing, Drugs, and Prisons, supra note 9, at 882; see also
ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 59 (2010) (stating that the war on drugs targeted
mostly low-level street dealers). See generally Stith & Koh, supra, note 9 at 227;
Orsagh & Chen, supra note 9, at 155 (“[W]hen prisoners serve longer sentences
they are more likely to become institutionalized, lose pro-social contacts in the
community, and become removed from legitimate opportunities, all of which
promote recidivism.”). In a recent speech to the American Bar Association,
former Attorney General Eric Holder censured the use of excessive prison terms
as an unsound criminal justice tool, blaming inflexible mandatory minimum
sentences and like practices for unreasonable sentencing disparities, unsustainable
prison overcrowding, astronomical recidivism, illogical financial burden, and an
overall ineptitude in achieving any true goal of criminal punishment. Holder,
supra note 9. More recently, President Obama has proclaimed that the time is ripe
for sentencing reform. Obama, supra note 1.
11
See generally Exum, Sentencing, Drugs, and Prisons, supra note 9.
12
According to President Obama, “We should pass a sentencing reform bill
through Congress this year.” Obama, supra note 1. Concrete efforts have already
been made to follow through on this declaration. See, e.g., Corrections Oversight,
Recidivism Reduction, and Eliminating Costs for Taxpayers in Our National
System Act, S. 467, 114th Cong. (2015); Smarter Sentencing Act, S. 502, 114th
Cong. (2015); Sensenbrenner-Scott SAFE Justice Reinvestment Act of 2015,
H.R. 2944, 114th Cong. (2015).
13
These “fruits” include, but are not limited to, prison overpopulation,
recidivism, exorbitant cost, and separation of families. See generally Jalila
Jefferson-Bullock, The Time is Ripe to Include Considerations of the Effects on
Families and Communities of Excessively Long Sentences, 83 UMKC L. REV. 73
(2014).
14
S. 467; S. 502; H.R. 2944.
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criminal sentences will cure a litany of America’s criminal justice
ills.15
The enactment of lengthy criminal sentence legislation relied on
two misguided beliefs: (1) that long sentences can achieve utilitarian
and retributive punishment purposes; and (2) that law and policy
makers and judges can accurately predict how much punishment is
enough at sentencing.16 In an effort to appear tough on crime,
lawmakers chose long sentencing periods almost arbitrarily, with no
empirical foundation or justification for sentence length.17 It is now
painfully obvious that lawmakers indiscriminately created an overly
punitive sentencing scheme with disastrous outcomes.18 Strict,
determinate sentencing ignores the indispensable and often
overlooked principle of uncertainty. While we know that the current

15
Marc Santora, City’s Annual Cost Per Inmate Is $168,000, Study Finds,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), http://nyti.ms/17QnidC; Erica Goode, Prisons
Rethink Isolation, Saving Money, Lives and Sanity, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012),
http://nyti.ms/18RVtb3; Brandi Grissom, Proposals Could Make It Harder to
Leave Prison, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 12, 2011), http://nyti.ms/1Tz8Lx3; Helen Vera,
The Definitive Case for Ending Solitary Confinement, SLATE (Feb. 26, 2014)
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/02/against_
solitary_confinement_states_are_finding_it_s_impractical_as_well.html.
16
PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO
SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 81 (2008) [hereinafter ROBINSON,
DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES].
17
See, e.g., Michael Isikoff & Tracy Thompson, Getting Too Tough on
Drugs: Draconian Sentences Hurt Small Offenders More than Kingpins, WASH.
POST (Nov. 4, 1990), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1990/11/04/gettingtoo-tough-on-drugs/2b616e5c-e450-47d9-ad6d-09e0c83d449b/; Peter Beinart, Hillary
Clinton and the Tragic Politics of Crime, ATLANTIC (May 1, 2015); see also Jeff
Stein, The Clinton Dynasty’s Horrific Legacy: How “Tough-on-Crime” Politics
Built the World’s Largest Prison System, SALON (Apr. 13, 2015),
http://www.salon.com/2015/04/13/the_clinton_dynastys_horrific_legacy_how_t
ough_on_crime_politics_built_the_worlds_largest_prison/; Ben Schreckinger &
Annie Karni, Hillary Clinton’s Criminal Justice Plan: Reverse Bill’s Policies,
POLITICO (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/hillaryclintons-criminal-justice-plan-reverse-bills-policies-117488.
18
William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards A Rational Cocaine
Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1266 (1996); Carrie Johnson, 20 Years
Later, Parts Of Major Crime Bill Viewed As Terrible Mistake, NPR (Sept. 12,
2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/12/347736999/20-years-later-major-crimebill-viewed-as-terrible-mistake.
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federal sentencing scheme is broken, we are unsure of how to design
a new sentencing structure.
The goals of federal punishment, as expressed in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), rely on both utilitarian and retributivist principles that
profess to punish offenders for both a larger societal benefit and to
properly penalize moral blameworthiness.19 The statute offers
deterrence of specific offenders, incapacitation, crime prevention,
distribution of just punishment, and effective offender rehabilitation
as appropriate sentencing goals.20 According to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
federal criminal punishment must align with the aforementioned
objectives, and they should directly inform the length of criminal
sentences.21 Regrettably, our current federal incarceration scheme
fails to fully achieve the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) or any
other U.S. penal code, and it has become evident that the damage
done to society and offenders due to these exorbitantly long
sentences is a substantial enough reason to restructure the
components of federal sentencing.
As modern-day reformers attempt to reinvent federal sentencing
laws, myriad questions must be answered: is incarceration still the
preferred punishment method? If so, how long must an offender
remain incarcerated? If not, how should offenders be punished?
Where should the punishment floor or point of departure begin? And
notwithstanding the punishment mode, how much punishment is
enough? This article submits that the current sentencing reform
debate must embrace the “principle of uncertainty” by admitting the
impracticality of determining the appropriate duration of
incarceration at sentencing.22 When attempting to solve a problem
involving a high degree of doubt or improbability, the principle of
uncertainty acknowledges what we do not yet know, accepts the
uncertainty, and then borrows from experimentalist theory to create
best practices that will assist in resolving the problem.23 This
principle must be honored in order to properly reapportion federal
criminal sentencing laws.
19

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
See generally id.
21
Id.
22
The “principle of uncertainty” is a term coined by the author. The concept
is borne of experimentalist literature theories. See infra Part III.
23
Id.
20
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Determinate sentencing was instituted, in part, to remedy the
unfairness and lack of uniformity inherent in indeterminate
sentencing.24 In its present form, however, determinate sentencing
has proven too rigid and far too excessive.25 This is its critical defect.
Its predecessor, indeterminate sentencing, while flawed in
application,26 was more ideologically sound. Indeterminate
sentencing permitted, through federal parole review, evaluations of
24

Modern-day determinate federal sentencing is a product of the Sentencing
Commission’s work under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION
[hereinafter
U.S.
SENT’G
COMM’N],
http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_
Overview.pdf (last visited July 12, 2016). Determinate sentences are definite in
length and are not reviewed by parole boards. Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV 83, 89–93 (1988).
25
Press Release, Justice Policy Inst., How To Safely Reduce Prison
Population and Support People Returning To Their Communities 1 (June 2, 2010),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-06_fac_forimmediaterelease_psac.pdf (“Contributing to the total number of people incarcerated is the reluctance
of parole boards to grant parole to all people who are eligible. Parole boards often
face public scrutiny if someone they release commits a new offense.”).
26
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE
IMPACT OF AN AGING INMATE POPULATION ON THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
3, https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/e1505.pdf (“Research indicates that the
growth in the aging inmate population can be attributed to sentencing reforms
beginning in the late 1980s, including the elimination of federal parole and the
introduction of mandatory minimums and determinate sentences.”); Jeremy
Ashkenas & Haeyoun Park, The Race Gap in America’s Police Departments,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1u2lVGc; Charles M. Blow, Black Lives
and Books of the Dead, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1HhEhc9;
Jeffery Goldberg, A Matter of Black Lives, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2015)
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/a-matter-of-blacklives/399386/; Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1L82Hcv; Sharon LaFraniere et al., Texas County’s Racial Past Is
Seen as Prelude to Sandra Bland’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1SJ4hAp; Kevin Sack & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Finds Most in
U.S. Hold Dim View of Race Relations, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1JBB3P4; Brent Staples, Opinion, The Racist Origins of Felon
Disenfranchisement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1qnflv5; Seth
Stoughton, How Police Training Contributes to Avoidable Deaths, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/policegun-shooting-training-ferguson/383681/; Justin Wolfers et al., 1.5 Million
Missing Black Men, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1P5JAPc.
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whether continued incapacitation was necessary postincarceration.27 Indeterminate sentencing acknowledged that it is
impossible to accurately determine duration of incapacitation at
sentencing.28 Creation of a new sentencing structure that utilizes a
sentencing effectiveness assessment tool post-sentencing will assist
lawmakers in formulating rational sentences that appropriately
punish offenders and benefit society.
This article proposes an alternative federal sentencing model
that embraces the principle of uncertainty. This new model will
punish the illegal behavior of offenders, while accepting that,
currently, tools do not exist to accurately apportion punishment at
sentencing. It will also argue that probation or home incarceration is
an appropriate floor or point of departure for most federal offenses.
Part I of this article provides lessons learned from the preSentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) rehabilitative sentencing model by
presenting a glimpse of the history of criminal sentencing in the
United States, emphasizing the shift from indeterminate to
determinate sentencing. Part II considers the failures wrought by the
SRA and questions the logic of that reform. Part III examines current
criminal sentencing reform-seeking legislation, assesses the oftneglected principle of uncertainty, and argues for its inclusion in the
current sentencing reform debate. Part IV critiques the presumption
of prison, examines the impact to offenders and the entire
community of lengthy, determinate sentences, and argues that none
of these outcomes are aligned with stated goals of federal
sentencing. Finally, Part V offers an alternative model of federal
criminal sentencing that both promotes sentencing goals and
supports offender and community success by embracing
uncertainty. This article does not propose the total abolition of
incarceration.29 Instead, it proposes a new model of sentencing,
which ensures that offenders are adequately and fairly punished and
prepared to successfully reenter society.
27

Weigel, supra note 24, at 104 (noting how the new sentencing guidelines
“eliminate[d] the ability of the Parole Commission to respond to prison
overcrowding by paroling less dangerous offenders”).
28
Indeterminate sentencing consists of a range of years, with a minimum
term, but an uncertain release date that is regulated by parole review. Id.
29
This article also does not suggest that particularly heinous crimes do not
warrant lengthy prison or other terms of incapacitation.
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I. THE RISE AND FALL OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCING
Understanding today’s determinate sentencing posture requires
a brief historical account of the history of punishment in our country.
Punishment has undergone drastic transformations since the
founding of the United States. Its development reflects society’s
assessment of man’s propensity for rehabilitation.30 For example,
colonial courts approved of society’s religious belief in the “basic
depravity” of man, and therefore refused to accept any sentencing
model that contemplated offender rehabilitation.31 Instead, colonial
courts punished offenders according to three distinct purposes:
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. Punishment was both
swift and harsh, often employing corporal punishment and various
forms of severe public chastisement. 32
Following the Revolutionary War, public sentiment changed to
conclude that people were curable, capable, and deserving of an
occasion to rehabilitate themselves.33 The predominant opinion was
that if offenders were appropriately incapacitated, they would, with
a program of “hard work and moral training,” become “cured of
[their] moral disease.”34 Criminal punishment, then, adapted to
mirror society’s overall perception of human beings as “rational and
30

See United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 1989);
see, e.g., Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of
Forgiveness, Hardship, Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such
Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737,
750 (2012) (“Presumably, a state’s legislature already considered community
views on appropriate levels of punishment when it graded offenses and set
sentencing ranges or guidelines.”); BAKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 42 (addressing
the “plummet[ing]” support of rehabilitative programs due to recidivism); THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, CRIME PUNISHMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION: A SUMMARY
OF RECENT STUDIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SENTENCING POLICY 2 (2000)
[hereinafter
THE
SENTENCING
PROJECT],
http://lobby.la.psu.edu/049_Criminal_Justice_Reform/Organizational_Statement
s/Sentencing%20Project/SP_Crime_Pub_Opinion.pdf.
31
Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1206 (citing ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF
SENTENCING §2 at 9 (1st ed. 1978)).
32
See, e.g., id. (noting how, in colonial courts, “[f]elonies generally were
punished by death; the penalty for misdemeanors ranged from being pilloried or
flogged to a term of hard labor”).
33
Id. at 1206–07.
34
See id. at 1206.
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responsible for their own acts,” and able to “respond to measures
designed to remedy their anti-social diseases.”35 The rehabilitative
model was born.
Quaker philosophy was fundamental in the development of the
rehabilitative model.36 Quakers contested the Puritan belief in the
basic depravity of man and espoused redemption.37 They fervently
trusted that incarceration in correctional facilities, combined with
hard labor and religious instruction, could provide freedom from
“corrupting influences” and requisite time to “reflect on moral
questions” so that offenders could be “restored to fellowship with
God and humanity.”38 Further, Quakers believed that “social
conditions were a cause of crime” and that society’s influence
created a “moral imperative to offer the offender a chance at moral
transformation.”39 Accordingly, many states abolished public
displays of punishment and corporal abuse, and began to explore
rehabilitation as a feasible goal of criminal punishment.40 During
this time of enlightenment, prisons were regarded as curative
institutions, qualified to teach inmates how to coexist lawfully with
others.41 More importantly, inmates were considered agents worthy
and capable of rehabilitation. By the late 1800s, the near exclusive
purpose of punishment was rehabilitation, with retribution and
deterrence holding incidental roles.42 Indeterminate sentencing,
with parole board review as the assessor of rehabilitation, was the
cornerstone of the rehabilitative model.43
35

1978).

ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, THE LAW

OF

SENTENCING § 1:2 at 11 (1st ed.

36
See Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011,
1013–14, 1039 (1991).
37
See id. at 1039.
38
See id. at 1039 (citing GERALD A. MCHUGH, CHRISTIAN FAITH AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 34–35 (1978)).
39
See id. at 1040.
40
United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 1989).
41
See id. at 1207.
42
Id.
43
See Paul J. Larkin, Clemency, Parole, Good-Time Credits, and Crowded
Prisons: Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7–8 (2013)
(discussing the creation of parole and its function under the rehabilitative model
of punishment).
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The rehabilitative model utilized a two-fold approach to
indeterminate sentencing, loosely mirroring healthcare delivery
models.44 First, judges rendered a “diagnosis” of an offender’s
individual “condition.”45 Probation officers prepared detailed
reports chronicling offender life history, accepting “any and all
evidence” as “relevant and necessary.”46 Second, correctional
officers began implementing a rehabilitative plan of care for
offenders upon their commitment to the correctional system.47 The
process worked as such:
Judges committed an offender to the custody of the
warden under an indeterminate sentence that gave
correctional officers ample opportunity to attempt
rehabilitation. Ultimately, a parole board would
decide if and when the prisoner had been reformed
and could be released. Once released, a parolee
would be subject to numerous restrictions on what he
could do, as well as subject to the supervision of a
parole officer.48
Under the rehabilitative model, then, indeterminacy and parole
were suitable partners, working together for the mutual benefit of
offenders and the public.49 The indeterminate sentencing model
accepted that duration of incarceration could not be correctly
44

Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1206–07.
See Larkin, supra note 43, at 8.
46
Id. at 8 n.39.
47
See id. at 8.
48
Id.
49
According to Professor Joan Petersilia:
Parole . . . during the first half of the twentieth century made
perfect sense. First, it was believed to contribute to prisoner
reform by encouraging participation in programs aimed at
rehabilitation. Second, the power to grant parole was thought to
provide corrections officials with a tool for maintaining
institutional control and discipline. The prospect of a reduced
sentence in exchange for good behavior encouraged better
conduct among inmates. Finally, release on parole, as a ‘backend’ solution to prison crowding, was important from the
beginning.
Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME &
JUST. 479, 489 (1999).
45
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established pre-incapacitation. Indeterminate sentencing relied on
parole review in evaluating when an offender was appropriately
rehabilitated, and therefore, suited for release. A close observation
of the history of indeterminate sentencing and its principal
evaluative tool, parole review, provides invaluable insight and
information that can assist in developing a new, effective criminal
sentencing model that embraces the principle of uncertainty by
evaluating sentence effectiveness post-sentencing.
A. Indeterminacy and its Progeny, Parole
Indeterminate sentencing birthed modern-day parole. Alexander
Maconochie, widely regarded as the father of the indeterminacy
movement, created the theoretical precursor to modern parole—the
mark system.50 The mark system recognized and celebrated prisoner
autonomy and dignity by incentivizing earned release through good
behavior.51 Prisoners were given a measure of “marks” at
sentencing, which could be accumulated by completing discrete
tasks.52 Further, marks were awarded for good behavior.53 For
instance, adhering to facility rules, educational excellence, and acts
of service and kindness merited marks.54 Marks were also used as
currency and to pay for prisoner food and clothing.55 Discipline was
administered through the mark system as well. In these ways,
Maconochie’s mark system apportioned “concrete and measurable
[goals], recorded from day to day, rather than at some distant point
in the future.”56 Prisoners received additional freedoms as they
earned marks, and the final stage of confinement prepared prisoners
for reentry into the community.57 Once prisoners completed the

50
Helen Leland Witmer, The History, Theory and Results of Parole, 18 AM.
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 24, 28 (1927).
51
Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of
Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 1029 (2013).
52
Witmer, supra note 50, at 26 n.2.
53
Doherty, supra note 51, at 968.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
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program and earned all assigned marks, release was unconditional.58
The goal “was to allow prisoners to earn early remission of their
sentences and at the same time provide them with the skills and
motivation to reenter society successfully.”59 Maconochie’s vision
relied primarily on prisoner autonomy by establishing an
indeterminate sentence that allowed prisoners to ultimately
determine their release dates. Under this system, marks evaluated
whether rehabilitation had been achieved.
Following Maconochie, Sir Walton Crofton further developed
the concept of indeterminacy by adopting the mark system and
expanding it to include conditional release, a precursor to modernday parole.60 Crofton believed that “prison programs should be
directed more toward reformation, and that ‘tickets of leave’ should
be awarded to prisoners who had shown definitive achievement and
positive attitude change.”61 Crofton’s model imprisoned offenders
under strict conditions for a period of time.62 Following initial
incapacitation, prisoners were transferred to intermediate prisons,
and were allowed to collect marks in a manner substantially similar
to Maconochie’s system.63 However, once they amassed an
appropriate number of marks, they were not released
unconditionally.64 Instead, prisoners were released on parole and
awarded tickets of leave.65 Police “generally oversaw [parolees’]
activities,” and helped them locate suitable employment.66 For
Crofton, marks were critical post-conviction tools that assisted in
determining whether an offender was sufficiently rehabilitated.67
Crofton, however, added conditional release to the rehabilitation
rubric. Unlike Maconochie, Crofton favored conditional release, and
firmly believed that it was critical to offender reintegration and

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 969.
Id. at 968.
Id. at 974–75.
Petersilia, supra note 49, at 488.
Doherty, supra note 51, at 972.
Id.
Id. at 973.
Id.
Petersilia, supra note 49, at 488.
See id. at 483.
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overall success.68 Crofton “justified . . . police supervision as the key
to overcoming stigma” and “believed that effective supervision and
summary revocation . . . would give the public . . . the confidence
necessary to accept convicts back into the community.”69 Under
Crofton’s system, “tickets were revoked for infractions such as
irregular reporting, loss of employment through drink, and brawling
in public.”70 This enhanced form of sentence indeterminacy coupled
with conditional release morphed into the modern-day parole
system.71
Zebulon Brockway, the architect of the U.S. parole system,
perfected Maconochie’s and Crofton’s models by merging
indeterminate sentencing and conditional release, and adding novel
components of post-release supervision and parole revocation
procedures.72 The Elmira Reformatory first implemented this new
system in 1876 when Brockway was appointed superintendent.73
Upon admission, inmates were automatically placed into the second
grade of classification, from which they could advance within six
months of good conduct.74 Promotion to the first grade, with a
showing of continued good conduct and character, earned release.75
Bad behavior, however, resulted in swift demotion.76 Once released,
offenders were paroled and closely monitored for an additional sixmonth period.77 Brockway touted the success of his model and
reported that, “eighty-two percent of parolees adjusted successfully
and did not return to crime.”78 Other U.S. prison systems duplicated
68

See Doherty, supra note 51, at 971.
Id. at 975.
70
Id.
71
See generally id. at 976.
72
Petersilia, supra note 49, at 488.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 488–89.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 489. During this period, parolees were required to “report on the first
day of every month to his appointed volunteer guardian (from which parole
officers evolved) and provide an account of his situation and conduct.” Id. (citing
HOWARD ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: THEORY AND PRACTICE (12th
ed. 1997)).
78
See Doherty, supra note 51, at 982.
69
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the Elmira system, and, by 1927, only Florida, Mississippi, and
Virginia did not have parole systems.79 By the 1950s, every state
and the federal government incorporated indeterminate sentencing
and parole review into its “core criminal justice policy.”80 Near the
end of the twentieth century, however, many criticized
indeterminacy’s usefulness and integrity.
B. Indeterminate Sentencing and the Modern Parole
Movement
For both Maconochie and Crofton, the goal of indeterminate
punishment, as measured by parole review, was successful prisoner
reentry to society. However, the indeterminacy movement strayed
far from its original intent.81 Historically, reentry was almost
exclusively premised on prisoner autonomy.82 In parole’s purest
form, parolees should earn parole release because they wish to be
better citizens, and prison must endow them with the tools they need
to be successful members of society. Sadly, the main focus of parole
shifted from rehabilitation based on free will to coercive
rehabilitation. Professor Fiona Doherty writes that Maconochie
would have been “horrified at the kind of arbitrary power” awarded
to parole boards.83 Likewise, Crofton respected the ticket of leave as
an earned “public symbol of trust.”84 The U.S. federal parole system
looked far different than this.
Congress enacted the first federal parole law in 1910,85 which
authorized the creation of individual parole boards at each federal

79

Petersilia, supra note 49, at 489.
Doherty, supra note 51, at 983.
81
Id. at 987.
82
See infra Section II.A.
83
Doherty, supra note 51, at 987. Maconochie believed that prisoner that
autonomy was a critical component of rehabilitation-based release. Id.
84
Id. at 987–88. Crofton regarded conditional release as “a means of publicly
testing and showing confidence” in the criminal justice system. Id. at 987.
85
PETER B. HOFFMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. PAROLE COMM’N,
HISTORY
OF
THE
FEDERAL
PAROLE
SYSTEM
1
(2003),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/uspc/legacy/2009/10/07/history.pdf
(noting the federal parole began when the first law was enacted in 1910).
80
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correctional institution.86 Law and policy makers agreed that it was
“better to return an offender to freedom ‘through a period of
controlled liberty’ than ‘abruptly to return him to complete freedom’
at the end of the prison sentence.”87 According to its terms, parole
was available to any inmate serving a sentence of one year or more,
upon completion of one-third of his sentence.88 In reality, however,
the U.S. parole system never focused on the type of rehabilitation
that was the epitome of Maconochie’s, Crofton’s, and Brockway’s
work. Instead, prison authorities used parole “primarily to manage
prison crowding and reduce inmate violence.”89 The congressional
record for the first federal parole statute in 1910 indicates a
departure from the rehabilitative goal of parole.90 Legislators instead
emphasized uniformity with state parole procedures and the
financial benefit of releasing prisoners early.91
The 1910 statute authorized the creation of autonomous, threemember parole boards, comprised of the physician of the
penitentiary, the Superintendent of Prisons of the Department of
Justice, and the warden of the institution at each federal correctional
facility, all of whom were free to make parole decisions at their
discretion.92 Upon release from prison, parolees remained in the
warden’s custody, and were supervised by parole officers and U.S.
Marshalls.93 Release and revocation standards were “vague,”
relying on such nebulous terms as “reasonable probability” and
“reliable information.”94 Parole boards authorized release if there
was a “reasonable probability that such applicant would live and
remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if in the opinion of
86

Parole Act of 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819, 819–21, repealed by Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742 (2006)).
87
Doherty, supra note 51, at 1022.
88
Parole Act § 1.
89
Petersilia, supra note 49, at 490.
90
Doherty, supra note 51, at 984–85.
91
Id. at 984.
92
Id. at 985. In 1910, there were three federal penitentiaries in the United
States. HOFFMAN, supra note 85, at 1.
93
Doherty, supra note 51, at 985.
94
Id. (quoting Parole Act of 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819, 819–21 § 3, repealed
by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987).
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the board, such release was not incompatible with the welfare of
society.”95 Both parole boards and wardens had authority to issue
revocation warrants, which were followed by board-administered
revocation hearings. Parole boards could revoke parole if there was
“‘reliable information’ that the prisoner had violated his parole.”96
Later in 1910, the Department of Justice promulgated rules stating
that “boards would only consider prisoners for parole if they had
been in the highest grade of conduct for six months preceding the
application,” and that “[a]pplicants had to secure a ‘first friend or
adviser,’ who would agree to employ them directly or try to find
employment for them while on parole.”97
Parole transformed radically in ensuing years. Congress
amended the federal parole statute in 1913 to include parole
eligibility for prisoners serving life sentences after completing
fifteen years of their sentence.98 General deterrence and
incapacitation were not primary goals of sentencing, and were
achieved only “incidentally to the offender’s rehabilitative
incarceration.”99 The parole board, whose job was to “monitor[] the
offender’s rehabilitative progress,” determined the actual length of
an offender’s term of imprisonment.100 The parole board would only
release the offender upon a determination of full rehabilitation.
Aligned with society’s belief in the reformation of individuals,
the rehabilitative model of punishment and the parole system were
honed in the 1930s, and dominated throughout the 1940s and
1950s.101 The 1930 amendment to the 1910 statute consolidated the
several parole boards into one board, empowered to grant release
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Id.
Id. at 985 (quoting Parole Act § 4); see HOFFMAN, supra note 85, at 12.
97
Doherty, supra note 51, at 986.
98
HOFFMAN, supra note 85, at 7.
99
United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 1989).
100
Id. Good-time laws, laws that predated parole laws, offered inmates time
off their sentences for “good behavior.” Larkin, supra note 43, at 11. “New York
adopted the first good-time law in 1817 and 44 other states followed by the end
of the century.” Id. Parole was initially viewed as a motivating “vehicle” that
urged offenders to rehabilitate themselves in order to gain early release. See Stith
& Koh, supra note 9, at 227.
101
HOFFMAN, supra note 85, at 7–16.
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absent Attorney General review.102 In 1932, parole board authority
expanded further, while parole became more restrictive.103 The
amended law provided that parolees shall remain paroled until the
expiration of the maximum terms of their sentences, without good
conduct credit deduction.104 Moreover, inmates released prior to the
expiration of the maximum terms of their sentence, due only to an
accumulation of “good time” credit, would be subject to conditions
of parole.105 In 1945, the board began to report directly to the
Attorney General, and in 1948 its membership was increased to
five.106 As time progressed, parole underwent even more significant
transformations.
Parole’s transformation continued into the second half of the
twentieth century. In 1948, Congress created the U.S. Parole
Commission,107 an independent agency within the Department of
Justice, charged with the “responsibility for making federal parole
release decisions, setting the conditions of that release, issuing
warrants for the arrest of parolees who have allegedly violated
conditions of their release, and determining whether release
conditions have in fact been violated and, if so, whether parole
should be revoked, modified, or continued.”108 Additionally, in 1949
the landmark Supreme Court case Williams v. New York clarified
that rehabilitation was the proper penal purpose and that sentences
must be individualized in order to accomplish effective offender
rehabilitation.109 The Commission’s powers were expanded in 1958,
when Congress again modified parole conditions to allow the
Commission to consider parole release either at any time or within

102
Id. at 7. During this period, the role of parole officer was also formally
created. Id. at 8.
103
Id. at 9.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 13.
107
Larkin, supra note 43, at 9 n.45.
108
Project Staff, Parole Release Decision Making and the Sentencing
Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 817 (1975). See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201–18
(repealed 1984).
109
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247–48 (1949).
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a period less than one-third of time served.110 This new legislation’s
goal was to allow the Commission wider discretion.
Despite its many metamorphoses, the U.S. parole system never
employed the concept of prisoner autonomy that was essential to
original parole models. Indeterminate sentencing was designed to
rely on self-driven prisoner improvement to assess and achieve
rehabilitation and release from confinement.111 Instead, the goal of
rehabilitation was thrust upon prisoners, and the Parole Commission
exclusively rendered decisions.112 Lack of prisoner participation
easily encouraged the sentiment that rehabilitation was
unachievable. Likewise, heavy-handed, exclusive decision-making
left room for ruinous condemnation of parole and the indeterminacy
movement. Parole’s reputation was sullied; it was no longer
considered a reliable evaluative tool.113
C. Criticisms of Indeterminate Sentencing, Rehabilitation,
and Parole
Scrutiny of the rehabilitative model jeopardized indeterminate
sentencing’s future. Beginning in the 1960s, scathing criticisms of
the rehabilitative model arose.114 By the 1970s and 1980s, increased
recidivism and a tide of drug-related violent crime drove law
enforcement, academics, political leaders, and the public to begin
110

HOFFMAN, supra note 85, at 15. Additionally, the 1958 legislation created
a presentencing observation period. Id.
111
See Doherty, supra note 51, at 987.
112
See HOFFMAN, supra note 85, at 11–12.
113
See infra Part II.
114
Several studies in the 1970s condemned rehabilitation as an unattainable
goal of criminal punishment. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and
Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974). In his work, Martinson
surmises that in the case of prison rehabilitation, “nothing” has worked or will
work. See generally id. at 48–50; Donald E.J. MacNamara, The Medical Model in
Corrections: Requiescat in Pace, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 439 (1977). Some critics of
rehabilitation claimed that it “victimized” prisoners by creating indeterminate
sentences which caused “uncertainty about their release date,” thereby subjecting
them to “arbitrary treatment because parole board decisions were unguided by
standards.” Vitiello, supra note 36, at 1027. Others criticized the rehabilitative
model claiming that rehabilitation was too lenient and not tough enough on crime.
Id. at 1030.
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doubting whether true rehabilitation of offenders was occurring or
even achievable.115 In response, the Parole Commission
implemented targeted reforms aimed at combatting allegations of
rehabilitation’s ineffectiveness and unfettered discretion inherent in
indeterminate sentencing.116
115

227–28.
116

Vitiello, supra note 36, at 1024–27; see Stith & Koh, supra note 9, at

First, the Commission began relying on community resources to inform
rehabilitation evaluations and support offenders post-release. HOFFMAN, supra
note 85, at 16. In 1962, the Commission began using pre-release centers
established by the Bureau of Prisons to assist offenders in transitioning back into
the community. Id. In 1963, consistent with an appeals court decision, the
Commission began conducting pre-revocation interviews with citizens in
communities where alleged parole violations took place. Id. at 17. Additionally,
Congress passed the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act in 1967, which provided
for a fixed sentence, but allowed for parole consideration after six months in
treatment and a certificate of eligibility from the surgeon general. Id. Next, the
Commission endeavored to curb commissioner discretion by instituting a new
pilot program designed to decentralize the parole decision-making process. The
program addressed six factors:
(1) the development of explicit parole policy guidelines to
provide greater consistency and equity in parole decision
making; (2) the provision of well-reasoned, written decisions;
(3) the guarantee of more timely decisions; (4) the development
of procedures to provide the opportunity for representatives to
appear at parole hearings; (5) the development of a two-level
appellate process to provide greater due process; and (6)
increased collaboration between the board and related agencies.
Id. at 18. In 1976, Congress passed the Parole Commission and Reorganization
Act (PCRA), its most significant reform. Id. at 21. Passage of the PCRA was a
direct response to parole’s harshest critics. New PCRA guidelines required
hearings every eighteen months for sentences less than seven years and every
twenty-four months for sentences greater than seven years. Id. at 22. Among other
things, it set procedures for appeals, set explicit guidelines for making parole
decisions, required denials in writing, and allowed inmates to review files. Id. The
PCRA also mandated that an “acceptable record of institutional behavior was
required” before granting parole. Kathleen M. Braga, Parole, 73 GEO. L. J. 727,
730 (1984). Once an offender was deemed sufficiently reformed, the Parole
Commission would then determine if release would “depreciate the seriousness
of the prisoner’s offense, promote disrespect for the law, or jeopardize the public
welfare.” Id. In accordance with PCRA directives, Congress enacted legislation
authorizing the formulation of a guideline table, similar to today’s sentencing
grids. Stith & Koh, supra note 9, at 229. The guideline table “consisted of a two-

366

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Reforms, however, proved unpersuasive, and in an attempt to
ensure uniformity in sentencing, Congress responded by wholly
abolishing federal parole in the SRA.117 The SRA placed sentencing
exclusively under the domain of the courts, with guidance from the
newly formed Sentencing Commission.118 By 1987, sentencing
reforms limited the Parole Commission’s authority to only a few
cases.119 Under new, stringent criminal justice reforms, offenders
would be sentenced to determinate terms of confinement, and were
required to complete 85 percent of their sentence, subject to limited
“good time” credit.120 Consequently, harsh punishments were
arbitrarily created.
dimensional matrix, with one axis assessing the severity of the offense and the
other axis assessing the seriousness of the inmate’s prior record. The box where
the axes met set a narrow range within which the inmate presumptively would be
released.” Id. Under this new system, the Commission
determine[d] the prisoner’s parole prognosis by calculating an
individual ‘salient factor score’ and then classifie[d] the
seriousness of the prisoner’s offense according to a chart listing
categories of severity. The matrix of the prisoner’s offense
severity rating and the individual’s salient factor score yield[ed]
the suggested time range of incarceration before release on
parole.
Braga, supra note 116, at 731.
117
United States. v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(relating the history of the establishment of sentencing guidelines and stating that
“[p]arole was abolished”). See generally United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d
1204, 1206–09 (11th Cir. 1989) (detailing the history leading to the establishment
of the sentencing guidelines and the process by which the guidelines are
implemented); Robinson et al., supra note 30, at 750 (“Presumably, a state’s
legislature already considered community views on appropriate levels of
punishment when it graded offenses and set sentencing ranges or guidelines.”);
BAKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 42 (addressing the “plummet[ing]” support of
rehabilitative programs due to recidivism); THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note
30.
118
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 2 (2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelinesmanual/2015/GLMFull.pdf.
119
See HOFFMAN, supra note 85.
120
The “[g]ood-time laws predate parole” and were often called
“commutation laws.” Larkin, supra note 43, at 11. Generally, the idea was to offer
an incentive for good behavior. In 1817, New York became the first state to adopt
laws allowing prisoners to earn good-time. Id. Federal good-time credit laws
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The abolition of indeterminate sentencing was fueled, in part, by
the sentiment that judges exercised unwarranted and dangerously
unfettered discretion in crafting sentencing decisions.121 During the
pre-SRA era, judges reserved the right to consider, more heavily,
offenders’ ability to rehabilitate in making sentencing decisions.122
That is, judges could tender sentences with a higher regard for
offenders’ individual characteristics and could offer indeterminate
sentences, with the benefit of parole review.123 After a period of
years short of the maximum sentence, parole boards would
determine whether an offender was sufficiently rehabilitated for
release.124 In this way, the indeterminate sentencing model
acknowledged that judges were ill equipped to determine how much
punishment was enough at sentencing. Judges imposed a shorter
sentence of incarceration, and then evaluated whether an offender
was appropriately rehabilitated through parole board review. If
began in 1875, before the federal prisons existed, and “[i]t offered . . . 5 days of
credit toward release.” Id. Today that good-time has increased to a maximum of
fifty-four days per year of “good behavior.” Id. It also extended to nonviolent
offenders who complete substance abuse programs. Id. After the enactment of the
SRA, parole began to die a slow death. Today, the commission continues to
oversee five groups of prisoners: (1) those convicted of crimes prior to 1987; (2)
those convicted of crimes committed in the District of Columbia; (3) military
offenders; (4) treaty transfer cases; and (5) witness protection cases. HOFFMAN,
supra note 85, at 30. The current Commission is composed of three
commissioners and a chairman, and was reauthorized in 2013 to supervise this
limited group of prisoners for another five years. Press Release, U.S. Parole
Comm’n, Senate Passes Five-Year Reauthorization for the U.S. Parole
Commission (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/uspc/pr/senate-passes-fiveyear-reauthorization-us-parole-commission. In its latest iteration, parole
eligibility depends upon an offender’s sentencing status. If sentenced as a
“Regular Adult,” an inmate is eligible for parole after serving one-third of his
sentence. Project Staff, supra note 108, at 818. Under an “(a)(2) sentence,” an
offender is eligible at the Parole Board’s discretion. Id. Such an offender is not
subject to any mandatory sentence length. Id. An (a)(1) sentence allows judges to
“set a minimum eligibility date at any point earlier than one-third of the
completion maximum imposed.” Id.
121
Weigel, supra note 24, at 98–99.
122
See id. (noting how judges made different determinations for sentencing
despite a similar end goal of rehabilitation).
123
Id. at 89.
124
Id. at 104.
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administered properly, the rehabilitative, indeterminate sentencing
model could have been wildly successful. Critics, however, argued
that indeterminate sentences were unjust and ineffective; that they
were too soft on crime and were administered inconsistently across
judicial districts.125
II. THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT AND THE UNREASONED FIGHT
AGAINST INDETERMINATE SENTENCING
Over the last few decades, we’ve also locked up more
and more nonviolent drug offenders than ever before,
for longer than ever before. And that is the real
reason our prison population is so high. In far too
many cases, the punishment simply does not fit the
crime. If you’re a low-level drug dealer, or you
violate your parole, you owe some debt to society.
You have to be held accountable and make amends.
But you don’t owe 20 years. You don’t owe a life
sentence. That’s disproportionate to the price that
should be paid. And by the way, the taxpayers are
picking up the tab for that price. Every year, we
spend $80 billion to keep folks incarcerated––$80
billion.126
Sentencing reform legislation and the dismantling of
indeterminate sentencing was nearly a decade in the making, and
involved the marriage of unlikely partners.127 Liberal and
conservative sentencing reformers alike viewed indeterminacy,
rehabilitation, and parole skeptically.128 Both groups demanded
determinate, ‘truthful’ sentences and feared judges’ unfettered
sentencing discretion. Liberal reformers worried that indeterminate
sentences favored members of the white, upper and middle classes,
while conservatives dreaded the “perceived leniency” of sentences
125

Id. at 98–99.
Obama, supra note 1.
127
Sandra Shane-Dubow, Introduction to Models of Sentencing Reform in
the United States, 20 L. & POL’Y 231, 235–36 (1998).
128
Vitiello, supra note 36, at 1014–15; see Stith & Koh, supra note 9, at
227–28 (discussing the history of liberal and conservative critics of the
rehabilitative model of prison).
126
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meted out by judges.129 Conservative criticisms of rehabilitation
were perennial—prisoners should not be coddled and must
experience pain of a measure at least proportionate to that of the
victim and/or the committed crime.130 Liberal critiques attacked
rehabilitation as an unquantifiable, incognizable, and therefore,
unachievable goal.131 Conservatives and liberals, then, combined
powers to create new sentencing guidelines. 132 Parole was
collectively viewed as a “sham.”133 Both sides agreed that
indeterminate sentencing was fundamentally unfair and trusted that
sentencing uniformity and determinacy were keys to reform.

129

Stith & Koh, supra note 9, at 227.
Francis T. Cullen, Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME & JUST. 299, 360–
61 (2013).
131
Liberal condemnations of rehabilitation were premised on the idea that
three specific factors would always trump the realization of prison rehabilitation:
(1) prison officials’ need to control prisoners to prevent escape; (2) prison officials
exercised broad discretion in rehabilitating prisoners; and (3) prisoners were
coerced into receiving rehabilitative treatments. Id. at 317–20. According to
liberals, these combined factors melded into a “toxic brew” that rendered prison
rehabilitation impracticable. Id. at 319.
132
The liberal ideal reasoned that “custody should only be used as a sanction
of last resort,” which “proved to be wishful thinking. Id. at 320. According to
Professor Frank Cullen,
[L]iberals and conservatives in the 1970s were calling for
similar policies—purging state officials’ discretion justified by
rehabilitation through determinate sentencing—but for
different reasons. Liberals believed that rehabilitation allowed
for coercive practices that victimized offenders; conservatives
believed that rehabilitation allowed for permissive practices
that victimized innocent citizens . . . . The key difference was
that liberals thought that prison was a severe punishment that
should be used sparingly and in small doses; conservatives
thought that prison was a much-needed mechanism—a
disincentive for the deterrable and a cage for the wicked—that
should be used extensively and in large doses . . . . But for that
moment, liberals and conservatives joined forces to accomplish
what they agreed on: to constrain discretion and to move toward
determinacy in sentencing.
Id. at 325 (citation omitted).
133
Vitiello, supra note 36, at 1021.
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A. Support for Indeterminate Sentencing’s Demise

The arguments that fueled the attack of indeterminate sentencing
were exceptionally well timed. In 1969, 81 percent of Americans
believed that the criminal justice system was damaged and that “law
and order had broken down.”134 Public opinion opposed leniency in
any form, including the idea of rehabilitation, and reformers agreed
that the inconsistency plaguing the judiciary required elimination.135
Critics judged that prisons were incapable of rehabilitation and
insisted that, “[n]obody knows how to rehabilitate people in
prison.”136 As Judge Marvin Frankel—widely regarded as the father
of the sentencing reform movement and the architect of the SRA—
stated:
If rehabilitation was not happening [in prison], it was
an illusion to have parole officials ostensibly
observing the process to determine when it had gone
far enough to warrant release. The illusion did not
gain substance from the accompanying realization
that responsible parole authorities were not claiming
that they knew how to gauge rehabilitation and were
not actually pretending to do so.137
Change was inevitable. Nevertheless, the course of change was
debatable.
In 1974, the Yale Law Journal engaged in a major project to
examine sentencing reform.138 The proposals borne of this project
and a seminar produced in its support assisted in providing the
impetus necessary to push Congress into action.139 Judge Frankel
produced his groundbreaking work as a result of these efforts. In this
seminal work, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, Judge
Frankel largely censured the unfettered sentencing discretion of
judges.140 Frustrated with the lack of guidance given to parole
134

Cullen, supra note 130, at 324.
Id. at 324–25.
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549, 597 (1991).
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Id. at 598.
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boards and the resulting absence of uniformity in release date
determinations, Frankel argued that:
We charge [parole boards] to make indeterminate
sentences determinate, but we give them no
conceptual or other tool to work with. We set them
lofty goals of rehabilitation, but with no direction or
means of achievement. The result is rage and
cynicism among the “alleged beneficiaries of the
rehabilitative ideal.” The system leaves them unable
to plan their time or to discover the rules on how to
secure their release.141
Around the same period, critics relied heavily on Robert
Martinson’s article, What Works?—Questions and Answers About
Prison Reform, accepting the author’s research and conclusion that
“nothing works” because “the rehabilitative efforts that have been
reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.”142
What Works? is a comparative study that aims to decipher whether
rehabilitation works by measuring the effects of rehabilitative
techniques and models on recidivism.143 Martinson considered the
educational and vocational training, counseling, medical treatment,
and post-release programs of his time to determine rehabilitative
efficacy and ultimately concluded that “these data . . . give us very
little reason to hope that we have in fact found a sure way of
reducing recidivism through rehabilitation.”144 Martinson’s work,
141

Vitiello, supra note 36, at 1023 (quoting M. FRANKEL CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 95–97 (1973)).
142
Id. at 1032–33 (quoting Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers
About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974)); see Robert Martinson, What
Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Spring
1974,
at
23–25,
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080527_197403502whatworksquestion
sandanswersaboutprisonreformrobertmartinson.pdf.
143
Martinson, supra note 142, at 23–25.
144
Id. at 49. Further, Martinson questions the utility of the medical model
itself, stating that
[O]ur present treatment programs are based on a theory of crime
as a “disease”—that is to say, as something foreign and
abnormal in the individual which can presumably be cured.
This theory may well be flawed, in that it overlooks—indeed,
denies—both the normality of crime in society and the personal
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which became a battle cry for reformers, may be viewed as the most
influential popular text against indeterminacy and rehabilitation of
its time.145 Armed with popular support and scholarly evidence,
legislators were finally prepared to pass sentencing reform
legislation.
Judge Frankel and others convinced members of Congress to
consider legislation that would erase the “commonplace” nature of
sentencing disparity and the broad discretion of federal judges.146
Senator Ted Kennedy, one of many sentencing reform leaders in
Congress at that time, expressed the prevalent belief that “[o]ne
offender may receive a sentence of probation, while another,
convicted of the very same crime and possessing a similar criminal
history, may be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment.”147
Kennedy advocated for the creation of a Sentencing Commission
tasked with the responsibility of creating sentencing guidelines
“with the goal of limiting excessive discretion while allowing the
full exercise of informed discretion in tailoring sentences to fit the
circumstances of individual cases.”148 He and other lawmakers
anticipated that legislation could reduce disparity in sentencing by
abolishing indeterminacy.149 This, he trusted, would render
sentences fairer and “reduce the widespread cynicism concerning
the penal system.”150
As a result, Congress investigated the state of federal sentencing,
ultimately concluding that the lack of confidence in rehabilitation
rendered rehabilitative sentencing impracticable.151 The

Id.

normality of a very large proportion of offenders, criminals who
are merely responding to the facts and condition of our society.
145
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Edward M. Kennedy, Commentary, The Federal Criminal Code Reform
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congressional inquiry concluded that judges arbitrarily and
inconsistently administered indeterminate, rehabilitation-focused
sentences.152 Consequently, the focus of federal criminal
punishment shifted from rehabilitation to retribution and
deterrence.153 The Comprehensive Crime Control Act’s sentencing
provisions, which were included in the SRA, stated that the “primary
focus of sentencing attention was no longer the offender, but rather
the offense.”154 Additionally, the Senate Report to the SRA
described the existing state of punishment as “based largely on an
outmoded rehabilitation model.”155 In fact:
The [Senate] committee rejected rehabilitation as the
primary justification of punishment. They argued
that deterrence was not a sufficient justification of
punishment although it was indeed relevant in
“justifying the existence of the criminal sanction.”
Ultimately, they endorsed the notion of just deserts
and concluded that “those who violate others’ rights
deserve punishment” . . . The just-deserts model,
according to the committee, is at odds with
rehabilitation.156
Rehabilitation and indeterminacy were dead. Ultimately, “the
conservative vision in due course prevailed,”157 and the result was
disastrous.
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 was “precedent
shattering.”158 It created the SRA, which formed the Sentencing
Commission, whose duty was to establish Sentencing Guidelines
accurately whether or when a particular prisoner has been rehabilitated. Id. (citing
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 40 (1984)).
152
See Vitiello, supra note 36, at 1027–29.
153
Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1208; see United States v. Roman, 989 F.2d 1117,
1121–23 (11th Cir. 1993) (Tjoflat, C.J. concurring). The Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984 featured retribution and deterrence as dominant federal
punishment goals. Id. at 1122–23.
154
Shane-Dubow, supra note 127, at 236.
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United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
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“regarding the appropriate form and severity of punishment for
offenders convicted of federal crimes.”159 The Sentencing
Commission’s explicit directive was to address Congress’s concerns
in the following areas: “(1) [structuring] the previously unfettered
sentencing discretion accorded federal trial judges. . .; (2) [making]
the administration of punishment . . . more certain; and (3)
[targeting] specific offenders . . . for more serious penalties.”160 The
SRA required imprisonment to be determinate in length, abolished
parole, and rendered release subject to “good time” credits only.161
Reform seekers decried judges’ and parole boards’ unfettered
discretion, formed unlikely bipartisan support, and stripped judges
of the sentencing authority they had practiced for years.162
Consequently, law and policy makers tied judges’ hands by
implementing lengthy, determinate mandatory minimum
sentencing.163 As a result, sentencing judges’ ability to consider
offenders’ unique circumstances was severely diluted. Rendering
mandatory minimum sentences advisory in later years did little to
empower sentencing judges to reduce the imposition of excessively
lengthy mandatory minimum criminal sentences.164 Recent studies
support the conclusion that lengthier sentences directly lead to
increased recidivism rates, negatively affect efforts to rehabilitate
prisoners, and are unfairly and undeservedly issued for most, if not
all, of the examined offenses.165 The sentencing scheme borne of the
159
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SRA neglected to achieve the type of uniformity or fairness that
reformers sought. Instead, it ignored the principle of uncertainty by
failing to acknowledge the difficulty in determining how much
punishment is enough pre-incapacitation.
The Sentencing Guidelines purported to establish honesty,
uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing.166 Specifically, the
Guidelines abolished parole in order to “avoid the confusion and
implicit deception that arose out of the pre-guidelines sentencing
system which required the court to impose an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment and empowered the parole commission to
determine how much of the sentence an offender actually would
serve in prison.”167 Ironically, the Senate committee “favored
alternatives to incarceration and short periods of incarceration in all
but the most serious cases if imprisonment was necessary.”168 The
committee did not foresee the SRA’s legacy of excessively long
federal criminal sentences.169 The Sentencing Commission’s legacy
lingers today in the form of severe mandatory sentences,170 limited
parole opportunities,171 and astoundingly increased numbers of

sentence . . . is associated with a 1.2 percent increase in recidivism”); VALERIE
WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 5 (2010),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf
(“[L]onger prison sentences were associated with a three percent increase in
recidivism. Offenders who spent an average of 30 months in prison had a
recidivism rate of 29%, compared to a 26% rate among prisoners serving an
average sentence of 12.9 months.”).
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1A1.3.
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incarcerated offenders.172 Unfortunately, in many respects the
Guidelines are the product of crafters’ creative imaginations and
their biases.
B. The Problem of Bias
Scholars agree that the Sentencing Commission “failed to give
the task [of developing Sentencing Guidelines] the serious attention
that it deserves.”173 Surprisingly, length of confinement and severity
of sentence was not premised on any evidence-based data, and
“[n]owhere in the forest of directives that the Commission has
promulgated over the last decade can one find a discussion of the
rationale for the particular [sentencing] approaches.”174 Instead,
Commissioners relied on the same “outmoded” sentencing structure
they wished to reform, and employed data that reformers themselves
deemed biased.175 In the words of sentencing scholar Professor
Jelani Jefferson Exum, “the Commission adopted an ‘empirical
approach that used as a starting point data estimating pre-guidelines
sentencing practice.’ However, developing sentencing ranges based
on past practices was not done in any regularized fashion.”176
Instead, “[t]he Commission increased penalties for white-collar
crimes and violent crimes, finding that the existing sentences were
172

See infra notes 287–89 and accompanying text; see also U.S. GOV’T
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inadequate.”177 Penalties for drug offenses relied on “weight rather
than empirical data related to the type of sentences being imposed
for such offenses or the harms,” thereby resulting in much harsher
penalties.178 In some instances, Commissioners averaged existing
sentences. However, in doing so, “the Commission retained the
same biases in the Guidelines ranges that led to disparate sentencing
in the first place,” and “allowed problematic sentences to serve as
the basis for the new sentencing ranges, as though those problems
could be averaged away.”179 Law and policy makers’ biases are
largely to blame for the unreasoned exercise that begat Guidelines
formulation, and for why judges followed suit.
1. Confirmation Bias
Scholars note that Guidelines formulation and application
represents psychologically biased responses to the widely accepted
problem of unfairness and inconsistency in federal sentencing.180
Since liberal and conservative “sensibilities” had already abandoned
rehabilitation, the necessity of its demise needed only be gently
“confirmed.”181 This is known as “confirmation bias.”
Criminologist Frank Cullen explains:
Psychologists use the term “confirmation bias” to
refer to the process of deliberately searching for
“confirming evidence . . . people and scientists quite
often seek data that are likely to be compatible with
the beliefs they currently hold.” At that time [during
sentencing reform], the confirmation bias was writ so
large that any evidence of [rehabilitative] program
success was attacked through an array of selectively
applied methodological and ex post facto
criticisms . . . called “treatment destruction
techniques.” Despite being on shaky empirical
grounds, . . . the “conventional wisdom” about
177
178
179
180
181
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rehabilitation’s ineffectiveness had become so
widespread that it was “agreed upon by
criminologists of nearly every persuasion and
theoretical orientation.”182
This is true even though much of the popular data supporting
rehabilitation’s ineffectiveness was blatantly unreliable and
“opponents of rehabilitation grossly overstated” their case.183
Enlightened studies explain that true comprehension of recidivism
rates involve “focusing not just on whether an offender committed
an additional offense, but also whether an offender continued to
commit new crimes at the same frequency after contact with the
criminal justice system.”184 Even Martinson’s seminal What Works?
is subject to scrutiny because, according to criminologists, it
inaccurately “define[s] ‘recidivism rate’ as ‘proportion who fail,’
and neglects to account for other factors.”185 The “regrettable fact
that many researchers had failed to follow rigorous scientific
procedures while evaluating these [rehabilitation] programs” was
“buried deep” inside Martinson’s article for the world to see.186
These studies found that diversion from high security facilities into
less crowded halfway houses can help reduce recidivism rates for
low-risk offenders, and that strict post-release supervision can
reduce youth recidivism rates.187 Nevertheless, confirmation bias
allowed Martinson’s work to effectively “nail[] the door shut on
rehabilitation’s coffin.”188
Even more shockingly, Martinson subsequently retracted his
findings and advocated for sentencing reform based on his new
research.189 His new, fully developed study concluded that
rehabilitation does work in particular situations, and that sound
182
Id. at 327–28 (quoting Michael R. Gottfredson, Treatment Destruction
Techniques, 16 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 39, 39 (1979)) .
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methods can be implemented to determine helpful, individualized
treatments.190 Martinson also advocated for the integration of parole
and rehabilitation into a more rational, determinate sentencing
scheme.191 Despite its availability, his new research was ignored.192
Instead, “rehabilitation was unintentionally sabotaged by evaluation
researchers (including many academics) who relied on weak or
faulty methodological procedures.”193 Confirmation bias had
already won. And it was supported by its brethren, status quo bias.
2. Status Quo Bias
The Guidelines’ starting point is also the product of unsound
psychological factors. In writing the Guidelines, Commissioners
“took ‘average current practice’ as the starting-point,” and, “by
analysis of many thousands of cases, []ascertained broadly . . . the
existing ranges of sentences, the recurrent factors influencing actual
sentences imposed, and the actual amounts of time served under
incarcerative sentences.”194 Even sentencing commissioners
extensively criticized this strategy in the immediate aftermath of
Guidelines creation. According to Judge Frankel:
One of the seven Commissioners, in a dissent,
charges that the guidelines were preceded by little or
no empirical study; that the starting-point of
‘averaging’ past sentences is not rationally
acceptable; that the Commission has failed to rank
offenses systematically, to chart a course that will in
fact reduce disparities, or to control departures
effectively or sufficiently. Coming from an opposite
direction, lawyers and judges have charged that the
Commission’s guidelines are an exercise in
‘robotics,’ substituting mechanics and arithmetic for
‘human’ sentencing; that the effort to administer the
guidelines will be uselessly complex and a source of
190
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voluminous litigation over issues never known
before; and that the claimed goal of reducing
irrational disparities will not be approached through
these formulations.195
Studies reveal that even in today’s era of advisory Guidelines,
judges still feverishly cling to the Guidelines, thereby exhibiting
status quo bias in making sentencing decisions.196
Many scholars have noted the presence of status quo bias in the
Guidelines formulation. Professor Jelani Jefferson Exum writes that
status quo bias empowers people to anchor numerical judgments in
initial values already available to them.197 Judges do the same––their
sentencing decisions are greatly influenced by suggested sentences.
However, a court’s reliance on the Guidelines as an anchor becomes
problematic when that anchor is biased in some fashion.198
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continues to insist that the
Guidelines be used as the baseline in rendering sentencing
determinations, and is “hesitant to let go of a familiar sentencing
instrument.”199 More disturbingly, status quo bias is the central
factor underlying the assumption that incarceration is an appropriate
punishment form. In formulating new, reformed sentences, law and
policy makers retained incarceration as the primary punishment
vehicle, never seriously considering its efficacy.200 Reformers
bashed rehabilitation, yet relied on its principal distributive tool in
devising new, “improved” guidelines.201 “[T]he Guidelines were
designed to be a work in progress, [yet thirty] years after their
195
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inception,” similar problems exist.202 The Guidelines have “fallen
short of their intended goals to bring uniformity, honesty, and
proportionality to sentencing, even after years of use and many
opportunities for improvements.”203 Yet, the Supreme Court has
continued to advocate for the Guidelines to “play a prominent
position.”204
III. EMBRACING THE PRINCIPLE OF UNCERTAINTY
To date, Congress has introduced several legislative instruments
that attempt to offer solutions to the present criminal justice crisis.205
Three principal bills, the Safe Justice Act, Smarter Sentencing Act,
and Corrections Act propose alternatives to the current sentencing
system.206 All three bills aim to improve our criminal justice system
by reducing recidivism, decreasing prison costs, and lowering the
prison population.207 The Corrections Act endeavors to decrease
recidivism and prison costs by offering vigorous rehabilitative and
job programs in prison, subject to “good time” credits.208 The
Smarter Sentencing Act reduces harsh prison sentences for drug
offenses by cutting existing lengthy sentences in half.209 Of the
three, only the Safe Justice Act unequivocally eliminates universal
imposition of excessive mandatory minimum sentences by limiting
their use to instances when “the defendant was an organizer, leader,
202
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manager, or supervisor of a drug trafficking organization of five or
more participants.”210 The Safe Justice Act eliminates strict
mandatory minimum sentences at both the beginning and end of the
sentencing process by limiting the imposition of lengthy mandatory
minimum sentences to instances where the defendant exercises a
leadership role in a drug trafficking organization,211 and expanding
back-end safety-valve relief.212 Unlike other bills, it imposes a
“presumption of probation” for nonviolent offenders, instead of
incarceration, as the sentencing starting point.213 Further, Title III of
the Safe Justice Act directs the Sentencing Commission to amend
its Guidelines to reflect “the intent of Congress that prison be
reserved for serious offenders for whom prison is most
appropriate.”214 All three proposals are preliminary steps in the right
direction. However, while each bill admirably attempts to create
robust reforms, each is significantly informed by status quo and
confirmation bias.
A. Confirmation and Status Quo Bias in Current
Legislation
None of the aforementioned legislative proposals dispenses with
the problem of bias. Neither the Corrections Act nor the Smarter
Sentencing Act questions the conclusion that prison is the
appropriate default criminal punishment. By simply decreasing
existing sentence length, the Corrections Act assumes that the status
quo––excessive sentences––is the appropriate point of departure,
and that merely decreasing sentence length will render sentences
just.215 Likewise, the Smarter Sentencing Act merely reduces
prevailing sentences without probing their effectiveness.216 The Safe
210
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Justice Act assumes that lengthy prison sentences are, in some form,
acceptable by neglecting to apply its amendments retroactively.217
The exercise of determining suitable sentences must begin with
what is before us––our current sentencing model—but must evolve
beyond it.
In actuality, it is unclear how criminal sentences should look.
The Safe Justice Act, Corrections Act, Smarter Sentencing Act, and
other modern reform bills strive to improve our federal sentencing
regime, but neglect to employ hard, evidence-based research to
support sentencing choices. Any fair, rational sentencing structure
must embrace the principle of uncertainty and admit the difficulty
in properly designing criminal sentences. Law and policy makers
should impose indeterminate sentencing pedagogy on the current
sentencing structure. The principle of uncertainty requires that
determinate sentences be subjected to rigorous review of
effectiveness post-sentencing, akin to indeterminate sentencing’s
parole review tool. Such a system would utilize a less restrictive
point of origin and rely on constant benchmarking and evaluation,
akin to that used in experimental literature, to determine the length
of sentence duration.
One major criticism of the rehabilitative model is that it did not
provide strict guidelines for criminal sentence duration.218 The preSRA sentencing scheme permitted judges to render unregulated,
disproportionate punishment.219 Reformers declared that the preSRA era failed to deliver real truth in sentencing by neglecting to
inform both the public and offenders of precisely how long an
offender would remain incapacitated.220 Such knowledge, reformers
insisted, is essential to a successful sentencing regime—one in
which the punisher, the punished, and the larger community can
enjoy confidence.221 SRA reforms, they maintained, remedied these
problems.222 This reasoning, however, is exceedingly problematic.
First, it ignores the possibility of bias and assumes that the
217
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219
220
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Sentencing Commission initially apportioned sentences correctly.
Second, it presumes that judges are capable of accurately calculating
the precise duration of incapacitation necessary to fulfill punishment
purposes at sentencing. Third, and most importantly, it professes
that an exact or correct term of incarcerative punishment actually
exists.
In reality, our criminal sentencing structure is a sort of “guessing
game,” during which we simply hope that we have correctly chosen
sentence duration. Current literature and failed sentencing reforms
demonstrate that the exercise of criminal sentencing is a task that
possesses immense uncertainty.223 The answer to the question, “how
much punishment is enough?” may never elicit a concrete, fixed
answer. In order to create a rational, fair sentencing regime, the
uncertain nature of this answer must be embraced. Yet, uncertainty
need not equal haphazardness or irrationality. Processes can be
established to create logical, well-reasoned outcomes even in the
face of uncertainty. Probing best practices from experimentalist
literature can assist in creating a structure that accounts for the
unknowns inherent in criminal sentencing in a responsible manner.
B. Linking Experimentalist Literature and the Principle of
Uncertainty
Experimentalism thrives in areas of increased flux where “rigid
forms of regulation are ill-suited to accomplish . . . designated
tasks,” and is often utilized in spaces where empirical and
experiential data is insufficient to provide accurate roadmaps.224
Instead of clinging to inflexible, ill-fitting rules, experimentalist
theory incorporates benchmarking of best practices, followed by
appropriate adjusting, and concluding with the adoption of sound,
well-informed, workable rules. Scholars suggest that
experimentalism can provide solutions in a variety of areas
characterized by “volatility and diversity, with concomitant
changing states of knowledge,” including education, administrative
regulation, community policing, environmental regulation,
223

See infra Part IV.
William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts,
Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L. J. 145, 153 (2007).
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employment discrimination, and public law.225 Through periodic
review and responsive recalibration, experimentalism succeeds in
creating a series of best practices that can propel progression of
uncertainty resolution.
The principle of uncertainty borrows from experimentalist
theories by searching for solutions in situations with a high degree
of ambiguity.226 In the area of federal sentencing, the principle of
uncertainty accepts what is yet unknown, recognizes that
uncertainty, and then relies on experimentalist theory to create best
practices that will assist in resolving the problem or completing the
task, despite the uncertainty. By setting appropriate “benchmarks”
and processes for constant reevaluation, experimentalism can assist
in creating sentencing order in an otherwise disorderly situation.227
To achieve sentencing fairness and effectiveness, length of
incarceration must rely on indeterminate sentencing pedagogy’s
acknowledgement of uncertainty, specifically by utilizing postsentencing review. Experimentalist literature provides a framework
for devising a sentencing structure that is effective, stable, fair, and
reviewable, despite uncertainty. Rooted in experimentalism, the
principle of uncertainty accepts the verity that “what works” is
constantly evolving as conditions naturally change.228
225

Id.
See id. at 155–58.
227
Id. at 154.
228
According to scholars,
[r]ather than a top-level bureaucrat choosing in a final way how
a car should be produced, “learning by monitoring occurs.”
Under learning by monitoring, the production process is
monitored . . . Recent works observe analogous political and
regulatory actions and argue that this mode of pragmatic
adjustment can and should be more widely adopted in the world
of government and law. This literature argues that for effective
regulatory choices, one needs to have a diversity of actors and
institutions, providing them room for experimentation, sharing,
and learning.
Id. Learning by monitoring requires pooling resources and periodic review of
existing systems, with the goal of creating viable, sound best practices. In both
the industry and government markets, “[c]ontinuous adjustment” and “exchanges
of information” are employed “to engage in benchmarking, simultaneous
engineering, and error correction,” which allows “collaborators to monitor one
226
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Experimentalist principles are already being adopted in
nonprofit and government settings to “redefine what counts as a
means to a guiding end.”229 Professors Michael Dorf and Charles
Sabor submit that government systems can be radically improved by
“the combination of decentralization and mutual monitoring
intrinsic to democratic experimentalism.”230 The experimentalist
view that they espouse lies in older pragmatist theories that
emphasize and embrace doubt or uncertainty as necessary to
improvement. Professors Dorf and Sabor describe this concept as
such:
The pragmatists understood doubt as the recurrent
yet always surprising breakdown of some of the
settled beliefs and expectations upon which we must
depend for active investigation of the world, not as
the expression of a global skepticism about the very
possibility of knowledge. Seen as localized
breakdowns in our expectations, doubt spurs inquiry
into remedial action and reforms conceptions. To
emphasize just how much doubt depends on surprise,
and how little on a first principle of skepticism, the
pragmatists urged a simple test: Try to doubt a belief
you hold deeply, and you will discover that you
cannot. Thus, pragmatism guides us in better coming
to grips with a circumstance that we have come to
anticipate: That experience will again and again
disrupt our habits and the understandings that rest on
them.231
another’s activities closely enough to detect performance failures and deception
before these latter have disastrous consequences.” Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabor, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267,
287 (1998).
229
Dorf & Sabor, supra note 228, at 284–85.
230
Id. at 267. They offer an improved version of democracy that balances
the Madisonian and New Deal governmental ideas, while permitting room for
recalibration. Id. at 283–84. They focus on “three central but troubled institutions
of American constitutionalism: federalism, separation of powers, and judicial
protection of individual rights,” and use them to illustrate this novel design of
government. Id. at 284.
231
Id. at 285.
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Following Dorf and Sabor’s model, uncertainty or doubt can assist
in eradicating bias. This design principle can work well in reforming
federal criminal sentencing laws.
In government settings, experimentalism, at its core, would call
for “a new connection between the broad pronouncements of the
legislature and the courts, and applications of these pronouncements
to particular situations.”232 In experimental settings, agencies pool
resources, share information, adopt best practices from each other,
and are open to the possibility of correctable error.233 Practices are
monitored scrupulously at all levels, and are improved or even
abandoned when proven unhelpful.234 This is what true reform looks
like. For Dorf and Sabor, experimentalist principles should be
injected into our government systems to improve government
function. In their opinion, states and the federal government should
pool information, employ benchmarking, and create best practices
to aggressively correct error.235 Successful engineering and
benchmarking requires agencies to share information across
disciplines, both vertically and horizontally.236 In this way, power
shifts “from ‘rulers’ to the ‘people.’”237 This experimentalist model
can be extended to federal sentencing as well.
C. Embracing Uncertainty in Current Legislation
Crafting a reformed sentencing model requires recognizing and
embracing the uncertainty inherent in determining punishment by
borrowing from experimentalist theory. Each aforementioned
congressional bill requires gathering best practices from state and
federal government entities, as well as continuous review at each
level of federal government to ensure that reforms are achieving
their desired end.238 In creating new rehabilitative prison programs,
232

Id. at 283.
See generally id.
234
Id. at 287.
235
Id. at 287–88.
236
See id. at 287 (detailing how “[t]he model requires linked systems of local
and inter-local or federal pooling of information”).
237
Id. at 313.
238
These bills require information gathering of “what works” among
government agencies. Sensenbrenner-Scott SAFE Justice Reinvestment Act of
233
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the Corrections Act requests that the Attorney General, Senate
Committees, and other relevant federal agencies certify proposed
programs, gather best practices from community and industry
partners, assess programs periodically, and evaluate the successes
and failures of specific prisoner participants.239 The Smarter
Sentencing Act mandates that the Attorney General submit reports
to Congress outlining cost savings resulting from reforms, and
concerning assessments of other efforts that will be used
prospectively to reduce crime.240 The Smarter Sentencing Act also
requires tendering of general reports on criminal offenses.241
Likewise, the Safe Justice Act includes strenuous, multiagency
review of offender case plans, recidivism rates, and overall effects
of each proposed reform, including revoking mandatory minimum
sentences, alternatives to incarceration, elimination of tough
punishment for technical probation violations, and implementation
of rehabilitative programs.242 It requires review to occur between the
Attorney General, Bureau of Prisons, state and federal agencies, and
other entities qualified to provide and/or assist in developing
quantitative and qualitative data.243 This type of multi-tiered,
continuous review, and fostering of best practices present in each
bill is lacking in our current system, but is critical in creating a new,
reformed model.
Embracing the principle of uncertainty demands an
understanding and acknowledgment of what is yet unknown,
coupled with a willingness to learn what appropriate punishment
should be. It demands commencing punishment from a wellresearched and thoroughly examined starting point, followed by
information sharing, benchmarking, and regular, stringent review.
The type of information sharing, benchmarking, and consistent
multi-tiered review espoused in the Corrections Act, Smarter

2015, H.R. 2944, 114th Cong. §§ 501–604 (2015); Smarter Sentencing Act, S.
502, 114th Cong. §§ 6–7 (2015); CORRECTIONS Act, S. 467, 114th Cong. § 5
(2015).
239
S. 467 §§ 2–3.
240
S. 502 § 6.
241
Id. at § 7.
242
H.R. 2944 §§501–604.
243
Id. at § 604.
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Sentencing Act, and Safe Justice Act244 fits well into the
experimentalist model that is critical to sentencing reform. Any
revised criminal sentencing structure must employ these same types
of review processes to evaluate reform effectiveness. Each proposal
correctly identifies critical areas of review. What is missing from
these and other federal sentencing reform proposals, however, is a
well-researched point of departure, instead of accepting prison as
default punishment. None of the proposals offer a clear rationale for
the duration of incarceration and simply fail to answer the question:
why incarceration?
IV. AN ARGUMENT AGAINST INCARCERATION
The American prison system is borne of the rehabilitative
model,245 and “[t]he concept of rehabilitation [has] decisively
determined Western society’s preference for incarceration as a mode
of punishment.”246 Historically, prisons and jails were institutions
where offenders could separate from society to reflect on their
misdeeds and contemplate return following an improved moral
condition.247 Oddly, the principal purpose of punishment radically
changed while the punishment distribution tool remained
unaffected.248 SRA reforms abandoned rehabilitation, thereby
promoting retribution and deterrence to punishment purpose
prominence.249 However, this shift in punishment purpose was not
accompanied by any contemplated or realized shift in punishment
method. The new Sentencing Guidelines strongly favored custody
over probation for most offenses.250 Reformers concluded that
prisons lacked the capacity to rehabilitate, yet failed to fully
consider whether prisons were capable of successfully deterring

244

Id.; CORRECTIONS Act, S. 467, 114th Cong. (2015); Smarter
Sentencing Act, S. 502, 114th Cong. §§ 6–7 (2015).
245
Edwin L. Rubin, The Inevitability of Rehabilitation, 19 L. & INEQ. 343,
352 (2001).
246
Id. at 350.
247
Id. at 351–52.
248
See id. at 360–65.
249
See Weigel, supra note 24, at 104.
250
Exum, Why March to a Uniform Beat?, supra note 175, at 155.
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crime or properly punishing moral blameworthiness.251
Confirmation and status quo bias contributed to this phenomenon.
Status quo bias allowed reformers to rely on an established prison
regime, while confirmation bias permitted reformers to rest
comfortably in that decision. This is best illustrated in the case of
drug offenses:
There is no empirical evidence that prior drug
trafficking convictions are better predictors of future
offending than other types of convictions. Nor is
there reason to believe that incapacitation of drug
traffickers is a sound crime control policy, since most
incarcerated offenders are readily replaced by others
willing to satisfy the unmet demand for drugs. The
best explanation, which is no justification, is that a
‘war on drugs’ mentality led to the harsher treatment
of drug trafficking offenses apart from any reason
grounded in . . . incapacitation theory.252
Likewise, recent studies reveal that “there is little evidence of
any link between crime rates and imprisonment,” 253 yet status quo
bias continues to justify excessive prison terms.
Federal sentencing guidelines purport to meld utilitarian and
retributivist theories of punishment, as expressed in the provisions
of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).254 Among the governing principles of
punishment enumerated in the statute are deterrence of specific
offenders, crime prevention, distribution of just punishment, and
effective offender rehabilitation.255 Together, the 3553(a) factors
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See id. at 156.
Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 171, at 73. Under the Career Criminal
Guideline § 4B1.1, certain classes of drug trafficking must be punished “‘at or
near the maximum term authorized’ for offenders with two prior adult convictions
for either trafficking or violent offenses.” Id. at 43 n.98.
253
Weigel, supra note 24, at 104–05.
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See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2010) (listing several factors a court must
consider when imposing a sentence, including “the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”).
255
Id.
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work collaboratively to guide judge and Sentencing Commission
decisions. 256 According to the Supreme Court:
In instructing both the sentencing judge and the
Commission what to do, Congress referred to the
basic sentencing objectives that the statute sets forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) . . . . The provision also tells
the sentencing judge to “impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with” the basic aims of sentencing as set out above.
Congressional statutes then tell the Commission to
write Guidelines that will carry out these same §
3553(a) objectives.257
The Guidelines themselves explicitly proclaim that “[t]he
continuing importance of the guidelines in the sentencing
determination is predicated in large part on the Sentencing Reform
Act’s intent that, in promulgating guidelines, the Commission must
take into account the purposes of sentencing as set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).”258 It is clear that federal sentences must reflect the
3553(a) factors. Congress desired that the 3553(a) factors would
contribute to a sentencing scheme that advanced its overarching goal
of achieving honesty, proportionality, and uniformity in
sentencing.259
The 3553(a) factors encompass the two major theories of
criminal punishment: utilitarianism and retributivism.260 According
to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2):
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes
set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The
court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider . . .
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

256

U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 118, at §
1B1.1(a)–(c).
257
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–48 (2007) (emphasis in original).
258
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 118, at §
1A1.2.
259
Id. (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 228 (2007)).
260
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2010).
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(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective
manner.261
Paragraph (2) expresses both utilitarianism and retributivism.262
In declaring that criminal sentences should “reflect the seriousness
of the offense” and “provide just punishment for the offense,”
paragraph (2)(A) communicates the retributivist concept that an
offender should only be punished according to his individual moral
blameworthiness.263 Paragraphs (2)(B), (2)(C), (2)(D), and the
remainder of (2)(A) illustrate utilitarian concepts.264 All four
sections discuss future crime prevention through general and
specific deterrence and detection, by proclaiming that federal
criminal sentences should “promote respect for the law,” “afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” “protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant,” and “provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”265 All of these
factors can be appreciated as abstract theories upon which
punishment must rely. Further, the beginning of § 3553(a) highlights
that imprisonment should both be informed and shaped by
utilitarianism and retributivism. Despite the express provision that
rehabilitation is a governing federal punishment principle, it is in
fact not a goal of modern-day incarceration. Similarly, neither
deterrence nor retribution support today’s imprisonment model. Our
current sentencing scheme does not deter crime effectively, nor does
261
262
263
264
265

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2010).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2010).
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D).
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it fairly punish moral blameworthiness. This is troubling, especially
because incarceration has emerged as the United States’ chief
punishment distribution vehicle. According to Professor Paul H.
Robinson, “the system’s general shift . . . has not been accompanied
by a corresponding shift in how the system presents itself.” 266
A. Modern-Day Prison Does Not Satisfy Retribution
Ultimately, today’s system of incarceration fails to satisfy
retribution because it lacks fairness. The theory of desert is
grounded in the notion that offenders should be punished fairly,
based solely on moral blameworthiness.267 There are three main
categories of desert, all of which apportion moral blameworthiness
differently.
First,
vengeful
desert
determines
moral
blameworthiness from the victim’s point of view.268 Second,
deontological desert embodies “a set of principles derived from
fundamental values and principles of right and good,” and
apportions moral blameworthiness based on the views of moral
philosophers.269 Third, empirical desert assigns moral
blameworthiness according to the community’s shared intuitions of
justice.270 None of the three categories of desert, however, justify
current-day incarceration as the principal mode of punishment
266

Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2001) [hereinafter
Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness].
267
See id. at 1442 (discussing how under the desert principle, “justice
requires that offenders of lesser blameworthiness receive less punishment than
offenders of greater blameworthiness”).
268
Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful,
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 145, 147 (2008) [hereinafter
Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert]. Under a vengeful desert
regime, offenders are punished in a manner similar to the harm done to the victim.
Id.
269
ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 139.
Deontological desert rests on moral judgments made “from the point of view of
the universe.” Id. (quoting HENRY SIDWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 420–21
(7th ed. 1991)). “[T]hus . . . [deontological desert] produce[s] justice without
regard to the political, social, or other peculiarities of the situation at hand.” Id.
270
Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert, supra note 268, at
149.
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because today’s system of incarceration fails to apportion moral
blame proportionally, and therefore lacks fairness.
Desert’s effectiveness strictly depends upon the community’s
perception of punishment as fair or deserved. In a desert-based
sentencing model, society agrees upon what criminal sanctions are
deserved by “pre-determin[ing] the severity of the punishments it
believes should accompany particular crimes.”271 Scholars agree
that desert is only effective if the general population is convinced of
its fairness. Professor Robinson writes that “deviating from a
community’s intuitions of justice can inspire resistance and
subversion among participants—judges, juries, prosecutors, and
offenders—where effective criminal justice depends upon
acquiescence and cooperation” and that “[l]iability and punishment
rules that deviate from a community’s shared intuitions of justice
undermine that reputation.”272
Modern-day incarceration lacks fairness and utilizes lengthy
criminal sentences to achieve retribution, even though it is possible
to accomplish desert with much shorter sentences.273 Sixty-two
percent of judges responding to a 2010 Sentencing Commission
survey stated that “penalties across all offenses were ‘too high,’”
and therefore, unfair.274 The Judicial Conference of the United
States has labeled mandatory minimums as producing sentences that
are excessively harsh relative to the gravity of the offense, stating
that, “a severe penalty that might be appropriate for the most
271

Michele Westhoff, An Examination of Prisoners’ Constitutional Right to
Healthcare: Theory and Practice, 20 HEALTH L. 1, 10 (2008).
272
ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 95–96.
The system’s intentional and regular deviations from desert also
undermine efficient crime control because they limit law’s
access to one of the most powerful forces for gaining
compliance: social influence. The greatest power to gain
compliance with society’s rules of prescribed conduct may lie
not in the threat of official sanction but rather in the influence
of the intertwined forces of social and individual moral control.
Id. at 96.
273
Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness, supra note 266, at 1432.
274
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010, 7 tbl.1 (June 2010),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchprojects-and-surveys/surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf.
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egregious of offenders will likewise be required for the least
culpable violator.”275 Even federal judges on both sides of the aisle
have expressed extreme regret and disappointment due to the
sentences that they had to impose statutorily. Supreme Court Justice
Anthony Kennedy stated our “[prison] resources are misspent, our
punishments too severe, our sentences too loaded . . . .I can accept
neither the necessity nor the wisdom of federal mandatory minimum
sentences. In all too many cases, mandatory minimum sentences are
unjust.”276 Former President Bill Clinton also lamented that
mandatory minimums were “overdone” and that “we [the federal
government] were wrong about that.”277 The current incarcerative
sentencing structure lacks the proportionality that retribution
requires.
Further, retributive punishment is grounded in morality and
relies upon the concept of free will, where offenders have “made a
rational and voluntary choice to violate a community norm,”278 and
“deserve to be punished because they freely chose to commit

275
Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Hon. J. Julie E. Carnes, Chair, Criminal Law Comm.
of
the
Judicial
Conference),
https://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Carnes090714.pdf.
276
ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 93. In her book, Professor Alexander
recounts stories of federal judges, both conservative and liberal, who have openly
denounced mandatory minimum sentences. According to Professor Alexander,
“Judge Lawrence Irving, a Reagan appointee, noted upon his retirement: ‘If I
remain on the bench, I have no choice but to follow the law. I just can’t, in good
conscience, continue to do this.’” Id. at 92 (citing Criticizing Sentencing Rules,
(Sept.
30,
1990),
US
Judge
Resigns,
N.Y.
TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/30/us/criticizing-sentencing-rules-us-judgeresigns.html). Further, she writes, “[a]nother Reagan appointee, Judge Stanley
Marshall told a reporter, ‘I’ve always been considered a fairly harsh sentencer,
but it’s killing me that I’m sending so many low-level offenders away for all this
time.’” Id. (citing Chris Carmody, Revolt to Sentencing is gaining Momentum,”
NAT’L L. J., 10 (May 17, 1993)).
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Peter Baker, Bill Clinton Concedes His Crime Law Jailed Too Many for
Too Long, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1HvZBL9.
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Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the
Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511,
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crime.”279 According to the theory of desert, criminality is a choice
manifested at the time that the criminal act is committed.280
Punishment is then distributed in accordance with the degree of
immorality of the criminal choice––a more immoral choice requires
more punishment, while a less immoral choice requires less.
For desert to function fairly proportionality must be
measureable—retribution requires punishment no more and no less
than what is deserved, “solely because the offender deserves it.”281
The basic premise underlying desert, however, is that what is
“deserved” is identifiable and quantifiable. In its current form,
retribution cannot be gauged and translated into precise prison
terms. Professor Paul H. Robinson argues that:
[T]raditional principles of incapacitation and desert
conflict; they inevitably distribute liability and
punishment differently. To advance one, the system
must sacrifice the other. The irreconcilable
differences reflect the fact that prevention and desert
seek to achieve different goals. Incapacitation
concerns itself with the future––avoiding future
crimes. Desert concerns itself with the past––
allocating punishment for past offenses.282
Further, Professor Russell Christopher insists that retribution
does not justify modern-day incarceration because it is temporal
punishment that consists of discrete component parts.283 He
concludes that temporal punishment can never satisfy retribution’s
proportionality requirement because it is impossible to serve the
entire sentence without unfairly serving less time.284 In his
estimation, serving less time than what is deserved violates
279

Erik Luna, Spoiled Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV.
23, 32 (2011).
280
See id. at 45 (“[C]riminal liability requires a voluntary act by the
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see also Arenella, supra note 278, at 1534–35 (discussing the view that some
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Russell Christopher, Time and Punishment, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 269, 282
(2005).
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retribution’s guiding principles.285 His reasoning and that of other
scholars, however, assumes that retributive blameworthiness can be
precisely quantified in imprisonment terms, and that we have
already correctly identified that measure.286 Professor Christopher’s
assertion that retribution cannot justify modern-day incarceration
because it consists of temporal, divisible terms, can be extended to
include that retribution cannot justify terms of incarceration because
what is “deserved” cannot be translated into prison time with any
degree of certainty.287 Retribution, though attractive, cannot justify
incarceration because, standing alone, it is unquantifiable.288 Any
improved sentencing model that embraces uncertainty cannot rely
on retribution as its guiding punishment principle.
B. Deterrence Does Not Yet Justify Modern-Day
Incarceration
Deterrence cannot reasonably justify modern-day incarceration.
Incapacitation aims to specifically deter because it demands
physical restraint as punishment in order to categorically prohibit
individual offenders from engaging in future crimes.289
Theoretically, incarceration is considered general deterrence as well
because it is crafted to threaten would-be offenders against engaging
in crime by publicizing imprisonment as its consequence.290
However, it is well established that lengthy incarceration fails to
deter crime, whether specifically or generally.291 This is most
evident when studying recidivism statistics.
285

Id. at 286.
See id. at 307–08 (discussing how retributivism “seeks to precisely
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Despite the imposition of excessively lengthy sentences,
recidivism rates continue to rise.292 More often than not, the long
and unfair prison experience turns offenders into hardened criminals
who are more likely to reoffend.293 For example, a study of national
recidivism rates of offenders released in 2005 reported that 68
percent were rearrested within three years and 77 percent were
rearrested within five years.294 Even certain courts have noted that,
“[t]he [prison] atmosphere makes debilitation much more likely than
rehabilitation. Whether by introducing petty criminals to more
violent offenders, forcing prisoners into racist gangs, or subjecting
them to violence and rape, too often the prison system serves merely
to exacerbate the criminal tendencies of its inhabitants.”295 Further,
the lack of rehabilitative programs in prison often leads to increased
recidivism. Many prisoners idly pass the time because rehabilitative

punitive political climate” that “provided the context for a series of policy
choices . . . that significantly increased sentence lengths”).
292
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(July
23,
2000),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/pp99pr.pr; Press Release, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National Correctional Population Reaches New
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Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to
2010 (Apr. 2014), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/rprts05p0510pr.cfm.
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See United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
Additionally, lengthy prison sentences and higher spending has not decreased
state recidivism. In the state system, two-thirds of offenders return to prison
within three years of release. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 3 In 4 Former Prisoners in 30 States Arrested Within 5 Years of
Release
(Apr.
22,
2014),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/rprts05p0510pr.cfm. This number is close
to 60 percent in some states. Id.
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educational programs, libraries, and drug program funding have
been cut.296
Academics contend that the incarceration rate is so elevated that
the “net effect is ‘crimogenic.’”297 This broken system actually leads
to a reduction in public safety, as prisoners leave jails more harmful
to society than when they entered.298 Studies now show that
increased penalties for second and third offenses may actually
“escalate the severity of a recidivist’s crimes.”299 Finally, former
federal prisoners are routinely returned to federal prison on
probation violations—most of them small, such as traveling out of
territory, missing a report appointment, using marijuana, and the
like.300 Often, returns are accompanied with new charges and more
296

See, e.g., Rehabilitation Programs can Cut Prisons Cost, Report Says,
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REG.
(July
1,
2007),
ORANGE
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/inmates-194495-prison-programs.html; Matt
Clarke, Prison Education Programs Threatened, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (May 19,
2014), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/may/19/prison-educationprograms-threatened/; Michael Rothfield, As Rehab
Programs are Cut, Prisons Do Less to Keep Inmates from Returning, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 17, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/17/local/me-rehab17; Mike
Ward, State Jails Struggle with Lack of Treatment, Rehab Programs,
STATESMAN.COM (Dec. 30, 2012), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/stateregional-govt-politics/state-jails-struggle-with-lack-of-treatment-rehab-/nTh8q/.
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TIMES (Dec. 12, 2012), http://nyti.ms/1BaNfWQ.
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See id. (defining “crimogenic” as “creating more crime over the long term
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(2010),
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Probation Violations: Who, What, and When, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 537 (2001)
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jail time arising from these violations.301 Modern-day incarceration
thus does not deter criminal behavior.
Further, scholars contend that current deterrence models cannot
predict future conditions. In Professor Paul Robinson’s words, “not
only does reliable deterrence analysis require information that is not
now available and an understanding of the interrelation among the
relevant factors that we do not now have, but it also requires a
constant updating of the analysis because the relevant factors
themselves are constantly in motion.”302 This disregard of change
extinguishes any meaningfulness in deterrence-purposed
incapacitation. Specific deterrence asserts that specific punishment,
usually incapacitation, is necessary to prohibit future crimes of the
offender. General deterrence hopes that the public crime prevention
message invoked at sentencing will remain the same throughout the
sentence, thus deterring others from committing crime. Neither of
these factors has proven true in our criminal justice system. An
offender’s degree of dangerousness, as a predictor of propensity to
commit future crime, cannot be measured at sentencing. Logically,
then, deterrence does not yet justify present-day incarceration.

301
See generally PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 300. Yet,
concurrently, federal expenditures for prisons have increased as the need to build
new prisons arises to support the exploding population. James Ridgeway & Jean
Casella, New Federal Budget: Plenty of Money for Prisons, SOLITARY WATCH
(Feb. 25, 2012), http://solitarywatch.com/2012/02/25/new-federal-budget-plentyof-money-for-prisons/.
302
See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 77. In
Professor Robinson’s words,
[T]his practice [of imposing determinate sentences soon after
trial] is highly inappropriate for effective prevention. It is
difficult enough to determine a person’s present
dangerousness—whether he would commit an offense if
released today. It is . . . [much] more difficult to predict . . . an
offender’s future dangerousness—whether he would commit an
offense if released at . . . the end of the deserved punishment
term in the future. It is still more difficult, if not impossible, to
predict today precisely how long the future preventive detention
will need to last. Yet that is what determinate sentencing
demands: the imposition now of a fixed term that predicts
preventive needs far in[to] the future.
Id. at 129.
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However, embracing the uncertainty inherent in deterrence-aligned
sentencing can assist in recalibrating prison’s purpose.
In this age of mass incarceration, deterrence and rehabilitation
must work as allies. Measuring rehabilitation can inform whether
specific deterrence has been accomplished, and ultimately, if
incarceration prevents or reduces crime. To do this, it is necessary
for incarceration’s focus to shift. If imprisonment is to remain as our
chief punishment tool, incarceration’s purpose must be specific
deterrence, measured by rehabilitation. However, fulfillment of
rehabilitation’s goals must be critically evaluated throughout the
period of incarceration.
C. Rehabilitation Should Be Modern-Day Prison’s
Purpose
In Tapia v United States, the Supreme Court confirmed that
rehabilitation must never be the goal of federal incarceration.303 In a
unanimous opinion, the Court reasoned that sentencing judges must
choose among “imprisonment, . . . probation, or a fine” as
punishment, and that they must consider the § 3553(a) factors in
doing so.304 However, the Court clarified that “a particular purpose
may apply differently, or even not at all, depending on the kind of
sentence under consideration,” and that rehabilitation should never
be considered in determining if and for how long to incarcerate an
offender.305
Alejandra Tapia was convicted of smuggling unauthorized
aliens into the United States and was sentenced to fifty-one months
in prison, followed by three years of supervised release.306 The issue
before the Court was whether the SRA “precludes federal courts
from imposing or lengthening a prison term in order to promote a
criminal defendant’s rehabilitation.”307 The Court held that the
sentencing judge unlawfully lengthened Tapia’s sentence to include
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Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 326, 332.
Id. at 321.
Id.
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a directive to attend a rehabilitative drug treatment program.308 The
Court found that the prohibition against using rehabilitation to
determine length of incapacitation was clear, emphasizing that even
the Guidelines “reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence
to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the
defendant.”309 According to the Court, “[e]ach actor at each stage in
the sentencing process receives the same message: Do not think
about prison as a way to rehabilitate an offender.”310 Rehabilitation
is only an appropriate consideration if courts choose probation or
supervised release.311 The Court emphasized that length of detention
must only be settled by § 3582 (a)(2).312 § 3582 (a)(2) states, in part:
The court, in determining whether to impose a term
of imprisonment, and if a term of imprisonment is to
be imposed, in determining the length of the term,
shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a)
to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing that
imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation.313
In Tapia, the Court made it abundantly clear that rehabilitation
cannot be incarceration’s purpose. However, if incarceration is to
continue as the principal punishment method, this must change. The
task of creating appropriate measures of rehabilitation remains to be
undertaken. Embracing the doctrine of uncertainty can assist in
repairing the relationship between rehabilitation and incarceration.
Following the experimentalist model, multileveled information
sharing and periodic reviews can assist in informing how to
rehabilitate and whether rehabilitation has been met in cases where
we choose to incarcerate.
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Id. at 334–35.
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V. A NEW MODEL OF SENTENCING REFORM
Any new model of federal criminal sentencing must embrace the
principal of uncertainty to craft fair, meaningful determinate
sentences that utilize a well-informed punishment floor, yet allow
room for substantial post-conviction review. It must begin with a
reasoned starting point, followed by periodic opportunities for
robust evaluation. If incarceration is to be imposed on offenders,
rehabilitation should be its only reasonable goal.314 However,
history has proven that traditional imprisonment should not be
presumed as the paramount punishment for the general population
of offenders.315 Instead, home incarceration and probation should be
considered sound as sentencing starting points.316 Current research
demonstrates that probation and community-based programs
effectively punish nonviolent offenders.317 To be successful, home
314

See supra Part IV.
Id.
316
Studies show that probation has been proven to achieve punishment
purposes for many offenses, and that strict home incarceration is sound
punishment as well. Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 13.
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In a recent speech to the American Bar Association, former Attorney
General Eric Holder lauded the accomplishments of community-based programs
in Kentucky, Texas, Arkansas, Hawaii, Georgia, North Carolina, Ohio and
Pennsylvania that have worked to reduce recidivism, decrease the prison
population, and save money. Att’y Gen. Holder, supra note 9. Attorney General
Holder praised a Kentucky program that “reserved prison beds for the most
serious offenders and re-focused resources on community supervision and
evidence-based alternative programs.” Id. This particular program saved more
than $400 million and is “projected to reduce the prison population by more than
3,000 over the next ten years.” Id. He also specifically referenced rehabilitative
programs in Texas and Arkansas that helped to reduce the prison populations of
those states by 5,000 and 1,400, respectively. Id. According to him, these types of
state programs have resulted in “three consecutive years of decline in America’s
overall prison population.” Id. He notes, however, that the federal prison system
continues to expand. Id. There is further evidence that community based programs
that de-emphasize incarceration work. For example, the West End Project in High
Point, North Carolina reduced crime by not incarcerating possible offenders
against whom they had acquired damning evidence. PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET
FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 25 (2009). Instead, police officers engaged
their families, community groups and evidence based programs to try to steer
them from a life of crime. See id. at 175. The program led to a 36 percent decrease
in crime. See id. (citing Drug Market Intervention Initiative, DEP’T OF JUST.,
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incarceration and probation must be supported by intensive,
community-grounded, evidence-based programs. Studies show that
implementing such reforms would decrease the prison population by
half, “with no detriment to public safety, and considerable savings
to taxpayers.”318 Home incarceration and probation are wellresearched sentencing points of departure.319
Using home incarceration and probation as sentencing starting
points, legislators can borrow concepts from the Safe Justice Act,
Smarter Sentencing Act, and Corrections Act to assist in crafting a
novel model of federal sentencing that ensures community safety,
penalizes offenders fairly, achieves punishment’s goals, and
embraces the principle of uncertainty.320 Without explicitly stating
so, the Corrections Act and Safe Justice Act correctly convert

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/topics/DMII.pdf (last visited July 12, 2014)).
Research suggests that, “[i]n-prison vocational programs produced net benefits of
$13,738 per offender” and that community-based employment and job training
services “yielded $4,359 per offender, the equivalent of $11.90 per dollar
invested.” PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S
EFFECT
ON
ECONOMIC
MOBILITY
23
(2010),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/collater
alcosts1pdf.pdf (citing STEVE AOS, MARNE MILLER, & ELIZABETH DRAKE,
WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS
TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND
CRIME RATES (2006), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-10-1201.pdf); see
ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, CUTTING CORRECTIONS
COSTS: EARNED TIME POLICIES FOR STATE PRISONERS (2009),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/Earned_time_report.pdf.
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BUTLER, supra note 317, at 182 (citing JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., JFA
INSTITUTE, UNLOCKING AMERICA: WHY AND HOW TO REDUCE AMERICA’S
PRISON
POPULATION
(Nov.
2007),
http://www.jfaassociates.com/publications/srs/UnlockingAmerica.pdf; see also FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA (1997).
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See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Sensenbrenner-Scott SAFE Justice Reinvestment Act of 2015,
H.R. 2944, 114th Cong., § 523(b) (2015) (proposing alternative sanctions to the
revocation of probation such as “community confinement[] or home detention in
order not to disrupt employment or other community obligation”); Smarter
Sentencing Act, S. 502, 114th Cong. (2015) (reducing sentence lengths);
CORRECTIONS Act, S. 467, 114th Cong. (2015) (allowing individuals to earn
“time credits” to become eligible for “prerelease custody”).
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incarceration’s principal purpose to rehabilitation.321 The
Corrections Act allows some offenders access to certified
rehabilitative and job programs and offers generous time credit
incentives.322 Recidivists and violent offenders are barred from
earning time credits for participation in such programs, but are
nevertheless awarded with increased visitation and phone usage
upon program completion.323 Likewise, the Safe Justice Act
establishes reliable, vigorous rehabilitation programs for all
offenders in order to fuel and improve reentry.324 Offering the types
of rehabilitative programs submitted in the Corrections Act and Safe
Justice Act in the manner prescribed by the Safe Justice Act will
result in a fair, cost-effective incarceration paradigm in situations
where imprisonment is deemed necessary.325
While ambitious, the Safe Justice Act and Corrections Act
neglect to provide genuine sentencing relief for the bulk of existing
offenders. Instead, they permit prospective relief for a small group
of future nonviolent, low-level, first-time offenders through the
presumption of probation and the option of home incarceration,
respectively.326 Those sentenced prior to the Safe Justice Act
becoming law may move the court to determine whether, in light of
maximum term reductions, the court will award them a comparable
sentence reduction.327 If denied, first-time offenders may refile upon
completion of recognized rehabilitative or reentry programs.328 The

321
See S. 467 (focusing on using programs to reduce recidivism); H.R. 2944.
The Smarter Sentencing Act appears to ignore rehabilitation completely by only
slashing certain mandatory minimum sentences by approximately half. See S. 502
§ 4.
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S. 467 § 7(c)(3)(B).
323
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2013),
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See S. 467 § 4; H.R. 2944, tit. IV, § 405.
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If the motion is denied, the movant may refile within 5 years of each
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reentry programs. H.R. 2944, tit. IV, § 405.
328
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Corrections Act does not even allow this type of partial relief.329
Moving forward, sentencing relief must apply retroactively.
Moreover, none of the bills contain a clear, evidence-based
sentencing starting point. This omission is most glaring in the
Smarter Sentencing Act, which simply shortens existing prison
sentences.330 The Smarter Sentencing Act neglects to employ any
hard research to justify why proposed sentences are suitable.331 The
Corrections Act steps in the right direction by demanding the
implementation of valuable recidivism reduction and job programs
in federal prison, but fails to confront the complex question of why
prison is the appropriate default punishment.332 It attempts to
question the efficacy of prison by introducing home incarceration,
but severely restricts that option.333 The Corrections Act also
effectively fails to reduce criminal sentences.334 The Safe Justice
Act also chooses a reasonable, reviewable sentencing point of
departure—probation. In presuming probation for certain offenders,
the Safe Justice Act’s authors affirm that they are not convinced that
prison is always the best punishment option. This presumption is
limited, however, to a small class of first-time, low-level, nonviolent
offenders.335 Any new sentencing model must seriously consider
probation and home incarceration as firm points of sentencing
departure for all nonviolent offenders.
Most importantly, embracing uncertainty requires the adoption
of rigorous review tools to evaluate the effectiveness of punishment
post-conviction. Each bill includes evaluative tools critical to the
experimentalist model. The Safe Justice Act’s reporting stipulations,
however, best mirror the type of resource pooling, information
sharing, benchmarking, and continuous evaluation required of an
experimentalist-informed sentencing archetype.336 First, the Safe
Justice Act compels resource gathering and sharing among the
329
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Sentencing Commission, courts, U.S. Attorney General, Bureau of
Prisons, and other state, federal, and community entities to create
thoroughly-proven,
evidence-based
recidivism
reduction
337
programs.
Next, the Safe Justice Act mandates creation of
individual offender case plans created by the Bureau of Prisons and
the Attorney General, and subject to local and executive review,
which will assist in benchmarking offender-specific best
practices.338 Finally, Title VI of the Safe Justice Act champions
vigorous continuous evaluation by requiring “transparency
accuracy” in reporting of mandatory minimum data, prison budget
and population impact, prosecutorial charging decisions, specific
offender data by institution, credit and recidivism reduction
programming, probation data, and supervised release data usage,
within one year of enactment of the Act.339
Further, reporting in the Safe Justice Act does not only occur
vertically. Rather, reporting is distributed horizontally among the
U.S. Attorney General, Government Accountability Office,
Congress, Bureau of Prisons, Inspector General, the courts, states,
and the community.340 The Safe Justice Act accepts the uncertain
nature of measuring punishment effectiveness, and appropriately
insists that both programs and case plans be reviewed, and possibly
reconfigured annually, to ensure offender and program success.341
This type of benchmarking and development of best practices is
most essential in fashioning a fair, rational, unbiased reformed
sentencing model. Combining a rational sentencing starting point
with vigorous evaluation will produce meaningful, true criminal
sentencing reform.
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CONCLUSION
The time is ripe for criminal sentencing reform.342 Similar to the
SRA era, critics on both sides of the aisle enthusiastically advocate
for change343––lamenting the fiscal, social, emotional, and cultural
costs of our present ill-structured system.344 Legislative and
executive leadership have joined forces to construct a rational, fair
sentencing paradigm and are poised to remedy the calamitous ills
wrought by criminal justice reform nearly three decades ago.345 The
setting is eerily familiar and the timing is again perfect—an
overwhelming majority of decision makers and the public agree that
our archaic sentencing structure must be reconfigured.346 This time,
however, it is essential to get it right. Modern-day sentencing reform
should proceed with the assistance of sound research, and must
remain committed to reevaluating that research until we achieve an
effective sentencing design.
During this renewed season of sentencing change, law and
policy makers must deliberately acknowledge the myriad SRAproduced catastrophes and disavow repeating the same ill-fated
mistakes. To do so, it is absolutely necessary to eliminate lengthy
mandatory minimum sentences for the general population of
offenders. Instead of following past practice of thrusting poorly
conceived terms of incarceration on offenders, sentencing type and
duration should be informed by reason and logic. Research proves
that probation and home incarceration is effective punishment for
the majority of offenders.347 Law and policy makers should engage
these tools to reduce prison overcrowding, decrease prison costs,
renew the fabric of communities, and properly and safely punish
offenders.
Finally, it is essential to harness the power of uncertainty by
imposing continuous evaluation of sentence type and duration to
measure effectiveness. Decision makers must reach back beyond
342
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344
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Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part V.
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SRA-era reforms and bring such knowledge to bear in crafting
current legislation. Borrowing from indeterminate sentencing
pedagogy, specifically in the area of post-sentence review, can assist
in engineering today’s renewed sentencing model design.
Embracing uncertainty will guarantee the creation of a sound, fair,
unbiased sentencing regime that is closer to understanding how
much punishment is enough.

